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 Collective memory is defined as any shared memory held by two or more 
members of a given social group. This type of memory has been studied intensely since 
Maurice Halbwachs’ introduction of the idea at the beginning of the 20th century. Until 
recently, cognitive scientists have not participated in the conversation on collective 
memory; however, one group of researchers recently introduced a model that compares 
individual and collective memory consolidation as analogous processes on different 
levels (Anastasio et al, 2012). This paper uses Anastasio’s model to explore the process 
of collective memory consolidation in contemporary Ireland (especially 1950-present), a 
nation that has experienced an enormous amount of cultural change in the past several 
decades. Over a period of two months (May-July 2015), 46 interviews were collected in 
various locations throughout Ireland. Focusing on important elements such as The 
Troubles, Catholic sexual abuse scandals, and the Celtic Tiger period of the Irish 
economy, qualitative data analysis shows strong evidence for the capacity of consolidated 
collective memory to be updated, fractured, and changed based on significant events, 
much like long-term individual memory. Due to the small scale of this study, the results 
should not be seen as exhaustive, but the beginning of a conversation on collective 







PART ONE: Defining and Contextualizing Collective Memory Consolidation	
Introduction to Individual Memory Consolidation	
 Humans’ fascination with the capacity to retain information is by no means a 
recent development; even the existence of language and art display our desire to record 
our experiences in a concrete fashion. Further, 17th and 18th century philosophers such 
John Locke mused about factors that affected “degree or strength of associations” 
between events (Tulving & Bower, 2000, p. 3). Psychologists were also intrigued by 
memory and learning, along with how to measure these processes. Hermann Ebbinghaus 
performed an early study on forgetting. Ebbinghaus taught himself lists of nonsense 
words and attempted to recite them after varying delays. He then graphed his retentions 
with respect to time in an effort to quantitatively model forgetting, finding that retention 
falls sharply within the first few hours following rehearsal, but then levels off afterwards 
(Ebbinghaus, 1885). Of course, this study includes various limitations; for instance, 
Ebbinghaus himself was the only subject in the study, meaning that the results probably 
were not statistically significant. However, Ebbinghaus’ research did set the stage for 
later study into human memory.	
 Since these early forays, research methods have become far more sophisticated 
due to vast technological progress as well as the proliferation of empirical studies on 
learning and memory. These factors have led to a more robust understanding of the 
complex processes underlying memory consolidation—also called “encoding”—and 
storage. 	
Several researchers have proposed models attempting to explain the mechanisms 
of memory in a more concrete manner. One of the first, most popular, and most 
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influential models is the Atkinson-Shiffrin model of memory. Sometimes referred to as 
the modal model of memory or the dual-store model of memory processing, this model 
became one of the first to propose a comprehensive system describing encoding and 
storage of stimuli into long-term memories (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). The figure 
below depicts the model.	
	
Figure 1: A diagram of the Atkinson-Shiffrin model of memory consolidation 
(Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968) 
As can be seen, the model postulates that stimuli from the environment are held briefly in 
sensory registers before proceeding through to more permanent memory stores; notably, 
it indicates that sensory inputs must first progress through a short-term memory store for 
rehearsal and manipulation before being permanently encoded in long-term memory. 
Consolidated memories can then be retrieved and temporarily moved back into the short-
term store for normal usage and interpretation. 	
 Though its significance cannot be denied, some have expressed skepticism 
regarding the model’s simplistic approach to modeling short-term memory. Baddeley and 
Hitch constructed a model of memory that attempted to remedy this flaw by proposing a 
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more complex, integrative configuration of short-term memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974). 	
  
Figure 2: A visual representation of the Baddeley-Hitch model of working 
memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).	
In this model, short-term memory is broken down into several different theoretical 
systems. The “visuospatial sketchpad” is used to represent and process new visual/spatial 
data; in essence, this system allows humans to hold information “in their mind’s eye” for 
a short period of time before this information is allowed to enter into the long-term 
memory store. The phonological loop performs the same function for incoming verbal 
information. An intriguing aspect of the model is Baddeley’s idea of a “central 
executive,” which organizes the input of information and modulates the entire working 
memory system. Neuroimaging studies involving active maintenance of visual processing 
indicate that the areas of the prefrontal cortex are likely implicated in the process of 
working memory (Braver et. al, 1997). This makes sense when considering Baddeley’s 
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theory, as the prefrontal cortex, specifically the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, seems to be 
primarily implicated in neural processes involving higher-order functions such goal 
setting, motivation, planning, and attentional control (Miller et. al, 2001; Johnson et al, 
2007; Amemori et al, 2015). Thus, this structure is integral in the operation of the central 
executive. 	
Baddeley’s model includes features that differentiate it from the Atkinson-Shiffrin 
model, namely the presence of a controlling entity that mediates short-term memory. 
Further, it incorporates specific sensory buffers, allowing for a more complex, integrative 
understanding of the processes. Interestingly enough, Baddeley’s initial model did not 
include an episodic buffer; this aspect was added much later as a space for organizing 
incoming information from the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad into 
sequential events (Baddeley, 2002). These factors will aid in understanding collective 
memory consolidation later in this paper.	
Recent research has also revealed trends in the process of encoding, one of the 
most compelling being that memory seems to be a state-dependent process. For example, 
in a study examining the effects of alcohol on remembering, researchers found that 
“greater retention was found for those subjects whose drug states were the same in 
memory consolidation and retrieval” (Lowe, 1982). Additionally, another study asked 
participants to learn two lists of words, one on land and one underwater. The results 
showed that lists learned underwater were better retrieved underwater, just as lists learned 
on land were better retrieved on land (Godden & Baddeley, 1975).	
However, research also indicates that human memory is not perfect—far from it, 
in fact. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the limited capacity of our short-term 
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memory, shown to be either four plus/minus one or seven plus/minus two items (Cowan, 
1993). Additionally, information that enters working memory requires attention prior to 
entering long-term memory. Indeed, one study demonstrated that splitting attention due 
to multitasking causes decreased retention of items in long-term memory (Craik et. al, 
1996). These data imply that we do not have the capacity to encode all environmental 
stimuli, meaning we must selectively attend to those stimuli we consider most pressing. 
In this sense, memory is not a perfect representation of events; instead, it serves as an 
incomplete, selective, personal store of attended information.	
 Errors in memory also occur after consolidation. For instance, after memorizing a 
list of words, people often claim to remember seeing non-present words that are similar 
to the words actually included in the list, a phenomenon known as misattribution 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Even more, people can often be swayed into recalling 
false memories when presented with misleading information regarding an event (Loftus 
et. al, 1978). Such studies indicate that our memories can actually be manipulated by 
outside sources, a phenomenon that will be explored further during discussions of 
collective memory.	
 Memory circuitry also seems to be inherently connected to neural structures 
implicated in emotional response. For instance, Elliott Wimmer and Daphna Shohamy 
demonstrated that due to connections to the striatum, the rewards center of the brain, the 
hippocampus can link our episodic memories to more pleasurable experiences, causing 
preference for these experiences later (Wimmer and Shohamy 2012). The amygdala, a 
major fear and emotion center in the brain, has major, direct connections to the 
hippocampus. This makes sense considering lesions to the amygdala cause impaired 
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explicit memory for emotionally charged events (Adolphs et. al, 1997). In this sense, 
memory might develop as an inherently biased personal narrative due to emotional 
influence.	
 Lesions to other neural substrates implicated in memory consolidation also 
cause profound deficits in memory. Since the hippocampus is considered the major center 
for memory encoding, it would make sense that damage would cause massive issues in 
processing. In one famous study, a man named H.M. had his hippocampus removed to 
remedy debilitating seizures. Though the seizures subsided, H.M. could not form new 
declarative memories or recall memories that were consolidated temporally close to the 
surgery (Scoville & Milner, 1957). However, he could remember disparately 
consolidated memories, such as those of childhood events. Thus, the hippocampus must 
be heavily implicated in memory consolidation--but not memory storage, which seems to 
be distributed throughout the cortex. Additionally, this study demonstrates that both 
anterograde amnesia—inability to form new memories—and retrograde amnesia—
inability to recall previously consolidated information—are possible after neural damage.		
Introduction to Collective Memory	
 The term “collective memory” is notorious within academia due to the difficulty 
in defining it. Social scientists generally point to Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945), a 20th 
century French philosopher, as the progenitor of the term. Halbwachs wrote quite a bit on 
the topic, with his books On Collective Memory (1950) and The Social Frameworks of 
Memory (1925). Halbwachs developed then-revolutionary ideas regarding the manner in 
which societies and other “collectives” of people engage and integrate their own present 
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experience with their past. He argues that “memory…is the basis for social cohesion” and 
that “individual and collective memory are [thus] inextricably intertwined” (Halbwachs 
& Coser, 1925/1992; Anastasio et. al, 2012, p. 46). Further, he believed that we construct 
our own memories based on the predilections, prejudices, and attitudes of the social 
groups to which we belong, along with our interactions with others in these groups, a 
view supported by several psychological studies, some of which will be expounded upon 
later in this section (Coman et al, 2009; Loftus et al, 1978; Loftus, 1993; Loftus et al 
2005; Wright et al, 2000).  Finally, Halbwachs writes, “it follows that there are as many 
collective memories as there are groups and institutions in a society” (Halbwachs & 
Coser, 1925/1992, p.22). Thus, for Halbwachs, collective memory is a recursive process 
that affects the way individuals develop memories and any defined social group—be it a 
nation, an ethnic group, or a family—has its own collective memory.	
 Since Halbwachs’ pioneering work, numerous scholars, primarily in the fields of 
history, sociology, and anthropology, have assumed the mantle of research on collective 
memory. Research has propagated at such a level that those interested in cognitive 
psychology have grown wary of, as Alin Coman et al (2009) put it, “the imperialistic 
march of memory studies across the social sciences” (p. 125). David Berliner (2005) 
imparts his skepticism of the proliferation of collective memory research in his paper 
“The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on the Memory Boom in Anthropology”.  Berliner 
comments on how the meaning of the term has recently become “muddled” in the social 
sciences due to overextension of meaning to comprise elements of culture and history; as 
a result, it has, in his words, “gradually become a vague, fuzzy label.” He also 
paraphrases Richard Terdiman (1993) by writing that he [Terdiman] “[argues]…that 
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memory is everything and everything is memory” (p. 206). John R. Gillis (1994) 
comments that the tangled meanings surrounding memory could be a result of the fact 
that memory and identity inherently depend on one another (p. 3). This essentially means 
that the study of collective memory should be done with a critical eye.	
 In light of these reservations, it makes sense to begin with a discussion of what 
collective memory is not. Firstly, it must be cautioned that collective memory should not 
be used as a catchall phrase comprising anything related to the history of a certain 
cultural group; in other words, collective memory is not synonymous with history, nor is 
it synonymous with cultural identity. Indeed, these processes are intrinsically related in 
that all three influence and connect with each other in many disparate ways, so it is thus 
very important to delineate their differences. While collective memory can be defined as 
any narrative or memory shared by a given social group, history aims to produce an 
objective and complex account of the past. Further, according to Wertsch & Roediger 
(2008), the process of collective memory “ignores counter-evidence in order to preserve 
established narratives” and “is impatient with ambiguity,” while history “recognizes 
complexity and ambiguity” and “aspires to arrive at an objective account of the past, 
regardless of consequences for identity” (p. 321). 	
 Additionally, a collective memory develops as an inherently biased narrative due 
to its close association with its social group’s identity; however, collective memory is not 
cultural identity. Collective memory is essentially a process by which cultural identity is 
continuously updated and involves “the concretion of identity” (Assmann, 1995, 130). 
Identity also comprises a set of characteristics beyond memory; for instance, language is 
a part of a culture’s identity, but not its collective memory. However, memory of 
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language acquisition and perceptions of language’s importance in culture are collective 
memory.	
 It is also important to note here that collective memory may not be a simple 
summation of the memories of individuals, though this view is still largely up for debate. 
Some researchers, such as James Wertsch, agree with a view of collective memory that 
accounts for the influence of social frameworks on memory, but believe collective 
memory to be no more than the sum of its individuals’ memories (Wertsch, 2002; 
Anastasio, 2012, 52). Others, such as Anastasio, Halbwachs, and Paul Connerton (1989), 
and Jeffrey Olick (1999) think of collective memory as more than a depository of shared 
memories—perhaps, in accordance with Anastasio, more suitably compared to complex, 
interconnected networks, such as the human brain. Consider his point of view regarding 
the issue:	
Whereas the brain is the medium for individual memory, society is the medium 
for collective memory. Just as neurons in the brain, interacting through their 
synaptic connections, can store and recall patterns, so people in society, 
interacting directly and through cultural tools, can form memories and remember 
the past in ways they could not do as separated, isolated individuals. On both the 
individual and collective levels, we can distinguish between memory structures 
(e.g. synapses, neurons, books, museums, etc.), which are objects, and memory 
consolidation (memory structure formation) and remembering (via memory 
structures), which are processes (Anastasio et al, 2012, p. 55).	
Though no empirical research has unequivocally proved the existence of a 
collective memory existing as more than the sum of its parts, I am inclined to agree with 
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Anastasio on the matter. Further, as the individuals making up a collective are 
interconnected and the resulting network forms defined, fixed representations of memory, 
the process of collective memory seems to follow a similar motif to artificial neural 
networks created by computational neuroscientists to simulate memory formation in 
individuals (Anastasio et al, 2012, 30-35; McClelland et al, 1995). In this sense, 
individual and collective memory formation are related in regards to manner of 
processing, which suggests the possibility of forming collective memory representations 
greater than the sum of individuals’ memories of a given event.	
Anastasio’s studies also indicate that collective and individual memories seem to 
be analogous processes: “Collective memory exists as a phenomenon unto itself that is 
similar to individual memory but occurring on different levels and taking different forms” 
(Anastasio et. al, 2012). He also presents a model for memory that can be used to 
describe both individual and collective memory consolidation, which will be expounded 
upon in later sections.	
Since these and other studies indicate the similarities between collective memory 
consolidation and individual memory, I will use a memory model proposed by Anastasio 
(2012) to look at these processes as analogous. Thus, since individual memory is 
inherently flawed due to various errors in encoding and retrieval and these memories feed 
collective remembering, these individual narratives consolidate to create a skewed, biased 
collective memory, which can then be fractured, shifted, and hijacked by literature, 
political ideologies or major social, political, and economic events—thus constantly 
changing cultural identity. I argue further that this cycle of collective memory also affects 
the way people develop individual memories, thus continuing the cycle and creating a 
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“patchwork” of collective memories and cultural identities. To illustrate my ideas, I use 
my own primary research, consisting of 46 interviews taken in Ireland.  These interviews 
were performed in multiple locations throughout Ireland, including Dublin, Galway, 
Belfast, Derry, and various small towns throughout the island so as to incorporate the 
identities of all areas. Review of the interviews indicates a nuanced spatial patchwork of 
identities and collective narratives throughout Ireland, along with a palpable, strong 
generational divide, especially when discussing politically and socially charged events. 
This generational shift serves as an interesting focus due to cultural upheaval in recent 
decades as a result of the Troubles, massive economic growth and decline due to the 
Celtic Tiger, Catholic abuse scandals, net immigration, and regional differences in 
modernization. I argue that these aspects, among others, created a perfect environment 
for collective memory to fracture, particularly across generational lines.	
The following sections will delve into further detail on the complexities of 
collective memory: the first will consider the importance of the individual in collective 
memory, while the second will describe the process of collective memory consolidation 
from a social psychological perspective along with its similarities to individual memory 
consolidation. These points of contact will prove useful when examining the nuanced 
manner in which a national collective memory developed in Ireland through a 
combination of social, political, and economic influences, and was subsequently 
damaged, fractured, and drastically altered during the latter half of the 20th century and 
the beginning of the 21st century. Such influences will be briefly noted here and expanded 
in Part Two and Part Three.		
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Importance of the Individual 	
If collective memory is, then, understood to be a collective process, potentially 
more than the “sum of its parts,” how and where does the individual factor into the 
equation? Historian Susan Crane asserts that social science should “writ[e] the individual 
back into collective memory,” as it is in the individual’s capacity to interact with history 
that collective memory becomes possible (Crane 1997; Anastasio, 2012, p. 54). 
Individuals are not only the basic root of collective memory but also a profound influence 
on its formation, able to manipulate the memories of other individuals as well as the 
group memory as a whole. This influence occurs during both the encoding and retrieval 
of memories.	
 Elizabeth Loftus revolutionized cognitive memory research with her pioneering 
study on misinformation effect in memory. During the study, approximately half of the 
participants were shown a sequence of slides depicting a car stopped at a stop sign while 
the other half were shown slides depicting the same car stopped at a yield sign. 
Afterwards, both groups were given a questionnaire about the video. For half of the 
subjects, the type of sign displayed in the initial slides was consistent with the type of 
sign mentioned in the questionnaire. The other half received a questionnaire in which the 
sign type was inconsistent with the sign displayed in the slides. The participants were 
given an irrelevant filler task and then given a forced choice recognition test in which two 
different series of 15 slides, one depicting each of the original conditions, were displayed 
at once. The subject was asked to select which slides he or she saw earlier in the 
experiment. Results showed that misleading information produced a greater proportion of 
incorrect memories than did true information, suggesting that either the original 
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information was not fully encoded before testing or that the misleading information is 
introduced into the correct consolidated representation after the fact, altering it (Loftus et 
al, 1978). Regardless, the key idea here is that individuals can recall incorrect details 
about an event in the presence of misleading information. 	
Other scholars have since explored misinformation effect in the context of social 
interaction. According to Coman et al (2009), “social contagion refers to the spread of 
memory—either true or false—from one person to another via social interaction” (p. 
131). This could, obviously, serve as a powerful tool for the spread of collective 
memories between individuals within a group. A group of researchers altered Loftus’ 
original misinformation experiment to examine the effects of social interaction between 
pairs of people on memory of information to which both were exposed. In a priming 
phase, participants were shown a series of 40 pictures, 30 of which corresponded with a 
series shown to the second member of each pair. Each pair was then shown all 80 photos 
and asked each time to, one by one, state whether or not they had seen the photo during 
the priming phase; thus, subjects were occasionally presented with misleading 
information prior to responding to a stimulus. Results indicated a “small but reliable 
effect of memory continuity” as prior presentation of accurate information bolstered 
accurate recall whereas misinformation increased the likelihood of incorrect response 
(Wright et al, 2000, p. 189). 	
Further, a second experiment involved separately presenting a group of photos of 
a crime to a pair of people. The photos showed generally the same information save for a 
few subtle differences. The pairs reconvened after a sequence of questions regarding the 
photos and were again asked questions about the crimes they were shown. Though initial 
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recall was accurate, most people ended up conforming after conversing with the other 
member; confidence notably predicted which person persuaded the other (Wright et al, 
2000, p. 195-99). These studies display the powerful role of social experience in regards 
to the formation of memory, along with the ability of people to influence memories of 
other individuals and the memory of a group as a whole. 	
Alin Coman and colleagues (2009) point out three aspects regarding the role of 
the individual in collective memory formation. First, they emphasize the importance of 
conversation on memory encoding—perhaps as an even more potent tool than physical 
collective memory structures, such as monuments and museums in that conversation is 
thoroughly implicated in the formation of “what has variously been called informal, 
vernacular, or counter-memories” (p. 130). Second, they discuss roles in conversation, 
specifically the role of the “narrator” and its connection to collective memory formation. 
Narrators are essentially those individuals prone to direction of a conversation as well as 
attention to certain details in the conversation, thereby making their version of a narrative 
more likely to enter collective memory (p. 133). Dominant narrators—narrators who 
“were particularly successful in transmitting their contributions to the conversation into 
the group’s subsequent collective memory”—influence both the likelihood of memory 
formation and the content of the memory (p. 134). This dominance tends to take shape 
quite often; in one study regarding familial conversation dynamics and collective 
memory, researchers observed the presence of a dominant narrator in 17 of 24 cases (Cuc 
et al, 2006; Coman et al, 2009, p. 133). Third, they indicate the role of expertise in social 
contagion, stating that people identified previously as “experts” seem to more reliably 
convince other individuals that their version of a narrative or memory is true (p. 134-35). 
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These aspects spread light on the nuances of memory consolidation in a group setting, 
especially the elements of social interaction that affect an individual’s ability to influence 
a group’s collective memory. One example of this phenomenon with regards to Ireland is 
the social power of Catholic priests through the 1950s. Since these people can be seen as 
experts with regards to theology and spiritual matters, it makes sense that people would 
be likely to conform to a somewhat repressive narrative with regards to accepted social 
interaction. This will be discussed further in Part Two. 	
Perhaps these dynamics could help explain the influence of certain politicians in 
20th century Irish politics, specifically Eamon de Valera, who served in various executive 
positions in the government of Ireland during the first half of the 20th century, including 
President of the Irish Republic from 1921-1922, Taoiseach (essentially Irish prime 
minster) from 1937-48, 1951-54, and 1957-59, and President of Ireland from 1959-1973.  
Though opinions on De Valera have vacillated more since the 1960s, he was incredibly 
well respected during his tenure in politics. Combining this respect with his vast 
experience in politics, De Valera certainly qualified as an expert, as defined by Coman, in 
the eyes of much of the Irish population at the time—which was still clinging to a 
romantic narrative of Irish Nationalism “built” by politicians and artists during the end of 
the 19th century through the beginning of the 20th century and the creation of the Irish 
Free State (Hutchinson, 1987).  De Valera also had a propensity for grand rhetoric, 
exemplified by his famous speech, “On Language and the Irish Nation” (1943), also 
known as “The Ireland that we dreamed of”, given on the 50th anniversary of the 
founding of Douglas Hyde’s Gaelic League. Consider the excerpt below, alongside 
MEMORY,	NARRATIVE,	AND	IDENTITY	SHIFTS	IN	CONTEMPORARY	IRELAND							19	
Wertsch’s argument that the state possesses a particularly strong ability to influence the 
collective memory of a nation (Wertsch, 2002):	
…The Ireland that we dreamed of, would be the home of a people who valued 
material wealth only as a basis for right living, of a people who, satisfied with 
frugal comfort, devoted their leisure to the things of the spirit – a land whose 
countryside would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages 
would be joyous with the sounds of industry, with the romping of sturdy children, 
the contest of athletic youths and the laughter of happy maidens, whose firesides 
would be forums for the wisdom of serene old age. The home, in short, of a 
people living the life that God desires that men should live. With the tidings that 
make such an Ireland possible, St. Patrick came to our ancestors fifteen hundred 
years ago promising happiness here no less than happiness hereafter. It was the 
pursuit of such an Ireland that later made our country worthy to be called 
the island of saints and scholars. It was the idea of such an Ireland - happy, 
vigorous, spiritual - that fired the imagination of our poets; that made successive 
generations of patriotic men give their lives to win religious and political liberty; 
and that will urge men in our own and future generations to die, if need be, so that 
these liberties may be preserved…(De Valera, 1943).	
Notice De Valera’s repeated emphasis on romantic notions of Irishness, such as “athletic 
youths” (which could be intended to invoke memories of Cuchulainn, the mythic Irish 
hero and nationalist icon) and “happy maidens,” both of which tend to figure strongly in 
Irish mythology1. Additionally, De Valera makes sure to reference the coming of St. 																																																								1 Lady Augusta Gregory’s Gods and Fighting Men (1904) is a good companion to Irish folklore, should the 
reader wish to read more.	
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Patrick, an event that strongly influenced both Irish history and folklore—which can 
serve as a vehicle for collective memory. St. Patrick also appeals to religion, thereby 
invoking a strong emotional response. As was stated before, the speech was also given to 
commemorate the Gaelic League, an organization that works to conserve the Irish 
language, an issue of pride and, thus, major emotion for many Irish people. No doubt 
these references were made intentionally to inspire emotion; indeed, several historians 
and sociologists have pointed out the unique emotional connection of the Irish to their 
folklore and Celtic past (Hutchinson, 1987; O’Kelly, 2004; Myers, 2011). Thus, in 
skillfully utilizing his position as an “expert” along with strong emotional cues 
throughout the speech, De Valera managed to create an incredibly strong collective 
memory of his “ideal Ireland” while continuing to feed an ongoing narrative of Irish 
nationalism during a time of national crisis—World War II. Interestingly enough, parts of 
Ireland began the process of modernization far before this point. For instance, Ireland 
embarked upon a major project, the Shannon Hydroelectric Scheme, from 1925-1929. It 
was “a far-sighted and innovative move” and would serve as an international model for 
similar electricity projects for years to come (Ferriter, 2005, p. 316). Additionally, it took 
place in County Clare, an often romanticized rural county--one de Valera would have 
been thinking of while making this speech. With this in mind, de Valera’s narrative of his 




Collective memory scholars have, until recently, been unsuccessful in producing a 
model for consolidation of collective memory. Anastasio et al (2012) present a distinctive 
and convincing view of collective memory and individual memory as analogous 
processes by using a model intended to compare the two processes. The model is 
reproduced below for convenience:	
	
Figure 3: “Three-in-one” model of consolidation, as detailed in Anastasio et al’s book, 
Collective and Individual Memory Consolidation. This model will be referenced often for 
the remainder of this paper (Anastasio et al, 2012, p. 72).	
 	
Note that this is not a suggestion that collective and individual memories are one 
in the same, an inaccurate point of view (Anastasio, 2012, p. 44). Instead, I argue in 
concurrence with Anastasio and others that collective memory and individual memory 
are analogous systems at different levels of processing; additionally, due to the 
individual’s ability to influence collective memory and the importance of social context 
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on the formation of individual memory, the processes are interconnected in many 
disparate ways.	
The first element of the model is the buffer, which essentially serves as a 
temporary storage space for unconsolidated memory. This element is strongly related to 
the visuospatial sketchpad and phonological loop described by the Baddeley-Hitch model 
of working memory. Indeed, for individual memory consolidation, this component is 
working memory, where stimuli and their meanings are held briefly prior to encoding 
into long-term storage via Hebbian learning, otherwise known as long term potentiation 
(Hebb, 1949). This process is heavily mediated by attention, as items must be attended 
for memory consolidation to occur. For collective memory, this process involves any sort 
of information distributed to a collective that has yet to be consolidated into collective 
memory. This can take the form of posters, propaganda, mass media, data, or cultural 
artifacts. It is only through interaction with the relationality element of the model that 
these labile memories become stable long-term memories (Anastasio et al, 2012, p. 91). 	
Several aspects of the buffer should be clarified here before continuing. Firstly, 
Anastasio points out that “contingency, catastrophe, and ‘the spirit of the secret society’” 
affect which private sources of information become available for public consumption in 
the form of archives—and, thus, for the process of memory consolidation (Anastasio et 
al, 2012, p. 94). The importance of discursive space—that is, a physical or virtual place 
where people can gather and discuss ideas through written word and conversation—in 
regards to the buffer element is also stressed with a comparison to Jürgen Habermas’ 
notion of the public sphere as a separate space from the political sphere (Anastasio et al, 
2012, p. 97; Habermas, 1989). Alin Coman and associates (2009) also stress the 
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importance of discursive space (p. 133). These discursive spaces act as a buffer in that 
new information is constantly brought to the attention of members of the collective, 
thereby making ideas available for consolidation.	
Two different discursive spaces are important when considering the collective 
memory/memories of Irish people. The first of these is the pub, which has traditionally 
served as a community center. Here, the general public is able to gather and discuss ideas, 
beliefs, and memories without fear for safety or vilification. Additionally, the pub 
functions as a venue for folk music performance, which often helps to build upon the 
collective nationalist narrative due to common themes of republicanism, reverence for 
martyrs, and the English as an enemy (Parfitt, 2015). Thus, nationalism is continuously 
kept in the attention of the collective.	
The second pertinent discursive space is the church. As will be explained in 
greater detail in the following section of this paper, Irish Catholicism was the dominant 
force in Irish social politics until the 1950s (Fuller, 2005; Walsham, 2012). Here, the 
parish priest, a position occupying massive social power in the traditional Irish 
community, could continuously update the collective memory of the community, utilizing 
his position as a spiritual expert to push Catholic ideology, such as sexual repression, into 
the community’s attention. Additionally, the church can easily connect with people’s 
emotions, further influencing memory. 	
The second aspect of Anastasio’s model is the relater, which can be compared to 
the hippocampus in individual memory. The relater is responsible for gathering items in 
the buffer for storage in long-term memory while establishing recursive, meaningful 
relationships with previously consolidated memories (Anastasio et al, 2012, 105-107). 
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For collective memory, this can be any form of conversation or dialogue, be it direct or 
indirect, between members of a collective that influences the consolidation of previously 
held or new narratives. Nationalism is an interesting example of the relater at work; it 
develops as a national narrative related to many common themes such as overcoming an 
enemy and the sacredness of the dead. Interestingly enough, nationalism develops best 
when the collective is historically homogeneous—which fits well for traditionally white, 
Catholic, conservative Ireland (Anastasio et al, 2012, 120-23). Another key factor of the 
collective relater is that collective memory is influenced by interactions between groups 
as well as within a group; thus, the entity is able to modify its own narrative as long as it 
is presented with a convincing counter-narrative.	
Finally, the third aspect of the model is the generalizer, which essentially operates 
as a store of consolidated memories (Anastasio et al, 2012, 128). For individual 
consolidation, this is mediated by the medial temporal lobes and the hippocampus, which 
aid in the production and storage of episodic memories from working memory. In 
collective memory consolidation, the generalizer acts on a group by strengthening or 
modifying of existing narratives through interaction with the relater element (Anastasio 
et. al, 2012).	
Using this model as a guide, the following part will detail the gradual construction 
of a national Irish memory in the 19th and 20th centuries and the beginnings of its 
subsequent disintegration from social, political, and economic perspectives by examining 
the influence of the Catholic Church, the Celtic Revival and nationalism, and the Celtic 
Tiger respectively. Afterwards, Part Three will use a combination of primary research 
MEMORY,	NARRATIVE,	AND	IDENTITY	SHIFTS	IN	CONTEMPORARY	IRELAND							25	
and other data to examine the systematic fracture of this narrative due to a “perfect 
storm” of events during the latter half of the 20th century.		
PART TWO: Historical Background of Irish Collective Memory Consolidation			
Catholicism, Social Dominance, and Sexuality	
In terms of cultural adherence, Irish Catholicism has been remarkably resilient 
and influential. Throughout history, the people of Ireland blended traditional Celtic 
culture with the burgeoning religion; perhaps this complex integration of Celticism and 
Catholicism provides rationale for its stalwart support among the Irish peasantry 
throughout occupation of Ireland. English conquest of Ireland brought along with it a host 
of tribulations associated with attempts at religious control. However, despite 
disenfranchisement, landownership restrictions, anti-Catholic legislation, and tense 
sectarianism, the Catholic Church gradually established itself as a powerful economic, 
political, and social force, setting the stage for its near-complete authority during the 
twentieth century (Scanlan, 2006, p.14; Aughey and Oakland, 2013, p. 85). Emmet 
Larkin argues that by the 19th century the Church had enough economic pull to divert 
considerable capital away from the Irish economy, possibly contributing to economic 
instability. Additionally, brought on by a nationwide “identity crisis caused by the 
gradual loss of the Irish language, culture, and way of life during the preceding century” 
along with a collapse of the credibility in the traditional “peasant belief system” due to 
the Potato Famine, Ireland’s Devotional Revolution from 1850-1875 continued to bolster 
the might of the Catholic Church as people converted en masse (Larkin, 1976, p. 4-6). 
The ratio of priests to laypeople increased from 1 in 3500 to 1 in 400 from 1840 to 1960, 
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reflecting the expanding visibility of the church; by the early twentieth century, “Catholic 
influence permeated both the law and the individual psyche” (Scanlan, 2006, p. 68). 	
 As Catholicism garnered more and more social power, it also gained control over 
Irish sexuality—with profound consequences. With the passing of referenda on 
everything from marriage to contraception to homosexuality, the Church effectively 
regulated the sexual culture and behavior of the country as a whole. Chastity became 
“both a religious and patriotic ideal,” and a sense of Victorian prudishness, in which 
everything carnal was taboo, became normality (Scanlan, 2006, p. 65). “While sexual 
desire and pleasure are obviously rooted in the body and soul of the individual, they are 
also central to social order and social control,” stipulates Inglis; in this sense, the Church 
sought to use its power to control sex, thereby maintaining order and containing the so-
called sins of the body (Inglis, 2005, p. 11). 	
Marriage, then, became the foremost method by which the Church managed to 
restrain the sexuality of Irish society and to decrease population growth. For women, 
expected to remain pure and modest for family’s sake, Catholic marriage control resulted 
in a strange duality in which some were prevented from access to their only source of 
sexual expression while others were expected to reproduce steadily (Inglis, 2005, p. 16-
17). The Irish people also upheld the sacrosanctity of established marriages. Divorce was 
not granted in Ireland until 1995, and contraception, while legalized in 1980, did not 
become readily available until 1993 (Scanlan, 2006, p. 66; Fuller, 2005, 51-52) Going 
further, the Church sought to curtail any sort of extramarital sexual expression, 
attempting to regulate all “occasions of sin,” or situations in which men and women 
would mingle socially, assuming that such gatherings would bring “temptations” (Inglis, 
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2005, p. 21-22). Thus, stepping outside of one’s marriage was grounds for public 
shaming; for instance, Charles Stewart Parnell, revered as an “uncrowned king” in 19th 
century Ireland, saw an infidelity scandal bring his political career to its bitter end 
(Larkin, 1961, p. 316). “What made Ireland unique,” says Inglis, “was how deeply 
Victorian practices and attitudes penetrated into the Irish body and soul” in terms of 
sexuality (Inglis, 2005, p. 23). Ireland, then, became a sort of social theocracy, a country 
in which the church maintained an iron grip on social norms with a striking authoritarian 
manner. Tim Pat Coogan (2003) even promotes the idea that “the only native Irish 
institution which might have fuelled fascist leanings was the Catholic Church, whose 
authoritarianism could in some ways be compared to the underlying basis of fascism,” 
with regards to the right-wing, extreme nationalist Young Ireland organization of the 
1930s (p. 204). Thus, through a steady era of power acquisition, the Irish Catholic Church 
essentially set the stage for an era of modern social dominance.	
This paradigm of church-society relations largely continued without challenge 
throughout the first half of the 20th century. Much of the Catholic hierarchy were Pro-
Treaty in the 1920s, in part due to a desire to continue its control in the new Irish Free 
State (Ferriter, 2005, p. 331). As the 20s came to an end, the church incited a moral 
“panic”, especially regarding contraception and the growing movement of modernism, 
which the clergy saw as detrimental to social mores or “obscene”. This came to a climax 
in 1929—after an inquiry from Kevin O’Higgins’ Committee on Evil Literature—with 
the establishment of the Censorship of Publications Act (Ferriter, 2005, p. 340-41). With 
its passage, the act allowed for the restriction of any book or publication due to 
“indecency or obscenity” and included a ban on literature advocating for contraception 
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and birth control; Mary Clancy also notes that this detracted from women’s ability to add 
to the birth control conversation as well (Coogan, 2003, p. 170). This could be the basis 
of Inglis’ (2005) assertion that Ireland experienced a “dearth of sexually transgressive 
literature” (p. 19). As such, the Church continued in its crusade to limit public access to 
increasingly modern ideas, which were being available in the collective buffer of other 
European nations. 	
By restricting public access to alternative narratives, Irish Catholic leaders 
assured their dominance over Irish collective memory consolidation, regulating access to 
generalized, long-term storage using censorship while also controlling the attentional 
capacity of the crucial relater element (Anastasio, 2012). This made sure that the 
dominant narrative in Irish culture was largely homogenous and Catholic-centric. Later 
political developments continued to aid this narrative, including Eamon De Valera’s 
recognition of the Church’s “special position” in Irish society in the Constitution of 
Ireland, enacted in 19372 (Ireland, 1937; Fuller, 2005, p. 41). Additionally, via 
correspondence with Pope Pius XII, Taoiseach John Costello’s Inter-Party Government 
assured their “filial loyalty” to the Catholic Church and their “firm resolve to be guided 
in all…work by the teaching of Christ (Fuller, 2005, p. 41-42) The Constitution’s 
wording and similar legislation not only aided with the Church’s legitimization of its 
power but also allowed for the intermingling of Catholic influence in state business, 
which certainly gave the clergy a large amount of political and social power.	
Despite its meticulous construction of social authority during the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the Irish Church’s power began to erode during the 1950s, seen by some as the 																																																								2	Article 44.1.2 includes the following clause: “The State recognises the special position of the Holy 
Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the 
citizens 	
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last decade of complete Catholic dominance in the social sphere. One major event that 
highlighted this was the Mother and Child Scheme of 1951, championed by Minister for 
Health, Noel Browne. The point of Browne’s idea was to provide free medical care for 
mothers and their children until the age of 16. Unfortunately for him, both the Catholic 
Church and medical professionals argued against the proposal, claiming it was “a threat 
to private medicine” (Ferriter, 2005, p.502) while others believed the country simply 
could not afford the reform (Fanning, 2008, p. 153). Further, “Catholic social theory” 
convinced many to argue “that it was unacceptable for the state, through the local 
authorities, to interfere with the private welfare of families and their children” (Ferriter, 
2005, p. 501). Rising tensions between Church and State eventually led the Irish 
government to demand Browne’s resignation at the behest of church officials; however, 
with an “unprecedented” decision, Browne complicated the situation on his resignation 
day by releasing “the full documentation of the correspondence which had passed 
between him, the bishops and the Taoiseach to all the newspapers” (Fuller, 2005, p. 47).  
According to Diarmaid Ferriter (2005), the Catholic Church remained “the effective 
government of Ireland,” but the public was finally aware of the extent to which the 
Church penetrated the public sphere (p. 504). This certainly caused the public to begin 
questioning the place of Catholicism in the Irish government, a trend that would define 
the remaining years of the 20th century.	
The Second Vatican Council of the 1960s continued the process of changing the 
role of the Irish Catholic Church. Fuller (2005) writes that “it was a blueprint for a more 
open questioning model of church—which was in stark contrast to the legalistic model 
which had characterized Ireland till then” (p. 49). This change, though not accepted by all 
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of the Irish clergy, began to quicken the population’s move away from adherence to the 
Church. The Sixties also brought the explosion of radio and television, which “pushed 
back the frontiers of what was acceptable overnight” and “[demanded] accountability of 
bishops, politicians, public servants, and private persons alike” (Fuller, 2005, p. 49). 
Since the Church could not regulate these forms of media—this fell to the government, of 
course—this development allowed for the exposure of the Irish populace to alternative 
narratives conflicting with Church control, accelerating the move towards secularization.  
Feminism added to the mix in the 1970s, promoting the legalization of contraception; 
many “saw the social values of Catholicism as a major obstacle inhibiting equal 
opportunities for women in Ireland, however personally devout they might be” (Foster, 
2008, p. 48). 	
All of these factors certainly aided in chipping away at the prominent Catholic 
consolidated memory, but the various scandals that plagued the Church throughout the 
90s and early 2000s were far and away the greatest and most sudden trauma. Firstly, the 
Church utilized asylums known as Magdalen Laundries to incarcerate women who 
became pregnant out of wedlock until as late as 1996 (Ferriter, 2005, p. 538). In 1993, 
155 bodies of women and children who had lived and died in the High Park Asylum were 
found in an unmarked mass grave in Dublin. The information was not leaked to the 
public until 2003, but the information caused a massive amount of uproar (Smith, 2007, 
p. 432). Additionally, the 90s brought the beginning of the highly publicized priest abuse 
scandals, during which allegations of systematic sexual abuse were brought to public 
attention. These scandals alienated many Catholics, who felt that the Church had betrayed 
them—especially given its propensity to preach against sexual immorality (Patterson, 
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2002, p. 293; Ferriter, 2005, p. 733). The sweeping effects of these traumatic incidents, 
especially the abuse scandals, will be detailed further in Part Three.		
The Celtic Revival, Irish Nationalism, and The Troubles		
Taking root in the late decades of the 19th century, the Celtic Revival was a period 
of renewed interest in Celtic culture. Inspiration for the movement, which comprised both 
the literary Celtic Twilight and the revival of the Irish language, came from a worry 
among artists, historians, and other intellectuals that Ireland had lost connection with its 
unique Gaelic history and heritage, due in part to English rule. This initiative came on the 
heels of the Potato Famine, which decimated the population of native Irish speakers as a 
result of malnourishment, emigration, and death. The leaders of the movement, such as 
W.B. Yeats, Lady Augusta Gregory, J. M. Synge, and Douglas Hyde wished “to revive 
an authentic, indigenous Irish folk culture” (Castle, 2001, p.1). In his 1892 speech before 
the Irish National Literary society, “The Necessity for De-Anglicizing Ireland,” Hyde 
complained:	
We have at last broken the continuity of Irish life, and just at the moment when 
the Celtic race is presumably about to largely recover possession of its own 
country, it finds itself deprived and stript of its Celtic characteristics, cut off from 
the past, yet scarcely in touch with the present. It has lost since the beginning of 
this century almost all that connected it with the era of Cuchullain and of 
Ossian…	
As Phillip O’Leary (1990) writes, this demonstrates Hyde’s notion of “nineteenth 
century Ireland’s simultaneous betrayal of her language and her history” (p. 88). In this 
context, these people endeavored to rediscover a Gaelic culture in Ireland, creating an 
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“aesthetic of cultural redemption,” from its English oppressors (Castle, 2001, p. 3). Yeats, 
too, contributed to this ideology. As a poet intensely interested in folklore, he was 
certainly inspired by ancient Gaelic literature and wished to reintroduce it into modern 
Irish culture. Much of his work contains allusions to Irish mythology and romantic 
notions of a Gaelic Ireland. Consider the following extract from his poem, “To Ireland in 
the Coming Times,” in which he muses about his connection to the Irish past and his 
hopes that his verses will continue into a modern future he believed to be dark:	
Yet he who treads in measured ways	
May surely barter gaze for gaze.	
Man ever journeys on with them	
After the red-rose-bordered hem.	
Ah, faeries, dancing under the moon,	
A Druid land, a Druid tune! (Yeats, 1892)	
Yeats’ imagery in this poem is certainly mystical, reflecting his desire to redirect public 
attention to folklore. Ciaran O’Kelly (2004) argues that Yeats believed that “the true Irish 
were the remnants of an unbroken line that provided a direct link to the ancient and pagan 
Ireland that was, most importantly, prior to England’s political influence” (p. 510), and 
Gregory Castle (2001) remarks on Yeats’ “desire to preserve and thereby redeem an 
authentic Irish folk culture” along with a “belief in the innate spiritualism and mysticism 
of the Irish peasantry,” especially in the west of Ireland (p. 41). Furthermore, John 
Fanning (2011) comments on how “deliberate the construction of this identity was” and 
how it continues into Irish culture today (p. 24). Yeats, then, was able to construct and 
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disseminate a particularly strong narrative that has since become consolidated in Irish 
collective memory.	
 Synge, a poet, writer, and playwright whose work benefitted greatly from the 
establishment of an Irish national theatre at the turn of the 20th century, also contributed 
to this line of thinking. Much of his work concerns somewhat romantic notions of the 
Irish West, which he, like Yeats, considered to be something of a haven of true, pagan 
Irishness. This includes his book, The Aran Islands, which details his journeys through 
the eponymous isles off Ireland’s western coast and his belief that they represent a culture 
separate from the Anglicized Catholic culture of the rest of Ireland (Greene & Stephens, 
1959, p. 98-99). Synge’s plays, notably Riders to the Sea—set on Inishmaan, one of the 
Aran Islands—and The Playboy of the Western World, set in County Mayo on the west 
coast, also factor into his depiction of the myth of the Irish west, which Luke Gibbons 
(1996) refers to as a “rural myth” and “soft primitivism,” a somewhat manufactured, 
idealized vision (p. 29). Gibbons also notes parallels between Synge’s depiction and the 
American West portrayed in Hollywood films (p. 25-35). In reality, Yeats’ and Synge’s 
views of the West is interesting in that they idealized a region of Ireland that was fraught 
with poverty and unemployment at the time. 	
Several of my interview subjects, notably Professors Mary Clancy and Lionel 
Pilkington of NUI Galway, discussed the impact of the romanticization of the west, even 
going so far as to deem it “dangerous.” Mary Clancy also noted the continued 
construction of this quixotic character in Albert Kahn’s 1913 collection of color 
photographs from the Irish west coast, taken by Marguerite Mespoulet and Madeleine 
Mignon-Alba, two French women. Clancy believes these photographs to be heavily 
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manufactured, specifically noting the image included in the appendix, saying, “I think she 
dressed up.” Her rationale relies upon the fact that the cloak worn by the girl would have 
been ceremonial dress and would not have even been worn by such a young woman. This 
type of doctoring certainly falls in line with the romantic ideas of the literary revivalists.		
 The mystical narrative created by the Celtic Revival certainly influenced the way 
Irish people think of their heritage, as will be discussed in Part Three, but it also had a 
major effect on the nationalist independence movement of the early 20th century. 
According to O’Kelly (2004), “The idea of being Irish that was articulated by the 
nationalists was rooted in the Celtic Revival” and “The Revival provided the basis for the 
nationalists’ political movement… It was also a move from largely justice-based to 
culturally-based demands for independence” (p. 510-511). Additionally, “though 
impossible to quantify exactly, the cultural renaissance of the previous decade… 
undoubtedly influenced many nationalists” (Ferriter, 2005, p. 112). Consider, for 
instance, the following excerpt from Padraig Pearse’s speech at the grave of O’Donovan 
Rossa, a former rebel in the 1867 Fenian Rising:	
O'Donovan Rossa was splendid in the proud manhood of him, splendid in the 
heroic grace of him, splendid in the Gaelic strength and clarity and truth of him. 
And all that splendour and pride and strength was compatible with a humility and 
a simplicity of devotion to Ireland, to all that was olden and beautiful and Gaelic 
in Ireland…The clear true eyes of this man almost alone in his day visioned 
Ireland as we of to-day would surely have her: not free merely, but Gaelic as well; 
not Gaelic merely, but free as well (McLoughlin 1996).	
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Pearse’s idea of an “olden” Gaelic Ireland here bears similarity to Yeats’ vision, and he 
also includes romantic, hero-like notions of the man. Further, the writers of the 1916 
Proclamation of the Republic of Ireland, distributed during the Easter Rising, likely 
included the clause “supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in 
Europe” to ensure they would be charged with treason, thereby guaranteeing their 
executions (Mitchell & O’Snodaigh, 1985). 	
Martyrdom and blood-sacrifice were themes of early Celtic mythology—seen 
especially in the Ulster Cycle and the popular myth of Cuchulainn. These themes were 
also utilized in the Celtic Revival, as seen in Yeats and Lady Gregory’s play Cathleen ni 
Houlihan. Roisin Higgins (2012) writes in her book Transforming 1916 that for young 
Irish men, as a result of the renewed attention towards the Cuchulainn myth and Pearse’s 
own writing, “true heroism therefore was cast retrospectively onto life only once it had 
ended in martyrdom” (p.116). In this context, it would seem that the signees wished to 
have their deaths serve as the fuel behind the nationalist movement, inciting others to 
follow in their footsteps to fight the British. The ploy ended up working, too: 	
The notion that the leaders, and the rebels who had died during Easter week, had 
willingly sacrificed themselves for the nation set in train a process of codifying 
the story of the Rising itself as a mythic and symbolic event, rather than as a 
military undertaking (Wills, 2009, p. 14).	
Feasibly, the combination of artistic leaders and political leaders espousing this 
narrative of a Gaelic Ireland accounts for its adherence in Irish culture, as will be 
expounded upon later. Consider once again Alin Coman’s idea of the expert. In this 
context, the major players of the literary Celtic Revival can be seen in the role of 
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“experts” by the Irish collective insofar as they were able to produce high quality 
literature; thus, writers such as Yeats, Synge, and Gregory were able to utilize the relater 
element to direct attention towards and consolidate a Gaelic Ireland memory seen as 
“true” by the Irish population. Going further, political leaders, also in the expert role, 
were able to use this generalized narrative to construct a strong, parallel, all-
encompassing cultural nationalist narrative.	
With this in mind, partition and The Troubles present an interesting problem for 
the republican, nationalist narrative. Clearly, the leaders of the nationalist movement 
attempted to create an us-vs-them ideology with regards to the British, so the voluntary 
departure of Northern Ireland from the Irish Free State definitely complicated the issue. 
While some, such as Yeats, considered the partition necessary—in fact, he was quoted as 
saying “when surly disagreeable neighbors shut the door, it is better to turn the key in it 
before they change their mind”—much of the population in the Republic of Ireland and 
most of the minority Catholic population in Northern Ireland favored reunification 
(Elliott, 2009, p. 118). Tensions between Northern and Southern republicans and 
Northern unionists slowly rose throughout the 20th century and into the Sixties. Sean 
Lemass attempted to normalize relations and soothe the impending conflict by meeting in 
Belfast with Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O’Neill in 1965—just before the 
50th anniversary of the Easter Rising— over border matters and industrialization (Foster, 
2008, p. 115). Though some saw this as a major step, the hostility between unionists and 
republicans boiled over into violence in the late 60s and raged until the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998. 	
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Conflict still occurs in certain areas of Northern Ireland, especially urban centers, 
and the wounds of the Troubles remain fresh. Violence seems to have made quite an 
impact on the collective consciousness of both regions. For instance, in one interview, 
Professor Richard McMahon of Trinity College pointed out:	
The violence in NI created a sense of separateness in the southern counties. The 
South remains a remarkably low violence society, while the North went from 
being one of the most non-violent societies in the 50s to being the most violent 
society in Europe in the 70s.	
 Interestingly, some consider the concept of “myth” to be a major cause of The Troubles. 
Graham Dawson (2007) defines the word as “understood to mean damaging 
misconceptions and falsehoods about the past, embedded in popular consciousness, 
which fuel the atavistic political identities of Ulster Unionism and Irish nationalism, and 
stir up political violence” (p. 35).  In this sense, consolidated collective memory helped 
cause the conflict and the conflict helped to create an altered narrative of greater 
separation. These notions will be explored further in The Troubles section of Part Three.		
Economic Change: Globalization and the Celtic Tiger		
 The foundation of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger economy of the 90s and early 2000s 
actually began much earlier—in fact, it can be traced back to Sean Lemass’ 
administration in the 1960s. Inheriting the position of Taoiseach in 1959 from its 
longstanding holder, Eamon de Valera, Lemass was faced with a daunting problem—the 
economy. Until his inauguration, Ireland largely had protectionist economic policies in 
place and was still feeling the effects of the Anglo-Irish Trade War. Lemass sought to 
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liberalize and diversify the Irish economy, which was in a state of stagnancy (Patterson, 
2002, 148). Though it would take a great amount of time, Lemass’ policies and legacy 
would eventually lead to massive economic success and modernization.	
 The first step was T.K. Whitaker’s “Economic Development” paper, written in 
1956 and adopted in 1959, which proved to be the catalyst for economic liberalization. 
Many see the ideas included in this document to be the “prelude to growth in the 1960s” 
(Kirby, Gibbons, and Cronin, 2002, p.6; Fanning, 2008, p. 8-9). The paper advocated a 
move away from agriculture and de Valera’s isolationist policies, a relic from the trade 
war of the 1930s. Additionally, it allowed for major tax breaks for foreign businesses in 
an attempt to attract foreign direct investment. Coupled with progressive education 
reform, Lemass’ policies quickly began to stimulate the economy. 	
Once Ireland joined the EEC—which would become the EU—in 1973, this 
growth began to reach new heights due to lenient EEC tax policies and continued foreign 
investment; indeed, “by 1973, new foreign-owned firms employed some 40,000 workers, 
or one-fifth of the manufacturing workforce of the Republic” (Patterson, 2002, p. 152). 
Although inflation, uncontrolled public spending, and emigration did detract from this 
benefit, the economy was on a path to success. Charlie Haughey’s government 
established Dublin’s International Financial Services Center in 1987, continuing Ireland’s 
shift towards a more export and service-based economy (Finance Act, 1987; Hardiman, 
2003, p. 7). That year (1987) also saw the beginning of the “Social Partnership” 
economic period (O’Malley, 2012, p. 14). This policy involved a partnership between the 
government, employers, and trade unions in an attempt to agree on various economic 
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issues in order to curb inflation, set fair wages, and promote further growth in the 
economy. 	
Other factors undoubtedly influenced the growth of the Irish economy. For 
instance, public health research indicates “the legalisation of contraception in 1980 
resulted in a sharp decline in fertility and a sizeable increase in the relative share of the 
working-age population,” which helps to explain the birth of the Celtic Tiger (Bloom & 
Canning, 2003, p. 229). However, the major causes, as outlined earlier, are usually seen 
as the end of protectionism, progressive educational reform, net immigration, foreign 
direct investment, and joining the EU. These factors helped to produce massive growth in 
the Irish economy from 1987-2001:	
Output in the decade from 1995 increased by 350 per cent, outpacing the per 
capita averages in the UK and the USA, personal disposable income doubled, 
exports increased fivefold, trade surpluses accumulated into billions, employment 
boomed, immigrants poured into the country…Between 1987 and 2001, the 
annual growth rates of the Gross National Product exceeded 7 per cent and 
sometimes touched double figures (Foster, 2008, p. 7).	
Though the economy would experience a major crash in 2008, likely due to the banks’ 
irresponsible lending practices and the bursting of a major property bubble, the Celtic 
Tiger moment in Irish history ran directly counter to the traditional collective memory of 
poverty and economic stagnancy that had been consolidated for years. Though poverty 
remained a major issue in certain areas and not all regions of the country experienced 
economic development at the same rate, the sudden explosion of Ireland’s economy had 
enormous, lasting effects on the collective memory of its people (Kirby, 2004). In fact, 
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the economy was a major issue discussed in many interviews, with wide-reaching effects 
branching into many other areas of interest.	
 	
PART THREE: Irish Collective Memory Today			
Methods and General Notes		
 To assess the changes in Irish collective memory, 46 interviews were collected 
over the course of two months (27 May-14 July 2015). 19 of those interviewed were 
female and 27 were male. The following age groups were formed to aid in analysis: 18-
29, 30-49, and 50+. Interviews were structured in that the same questions were asked to 
each person, but also fluid in that subjects were permitted to take the conversation down 
different paths depending on their answers to the standard questions. Questions are 
available in the appendix. This free-form direction was taken to allow people to freely 
recall memories and to eliminate observer bias due to directed questions. Additionally, 
interviews were geographically dispersed so as to eliminate substantial geographical bias 
in data. 	
 One of the major questions asked was “What do you see as the most prominent 
cultural change or changes in the past five decades?” Of the youngest age group, seven 
reported a sense of “openness,” three reported economic change, three reported political 
change, and one reported no change. Of the middle age group, four reported economic 
change, four for demographic change, three for “openness,” three reported religion, one 
for political change, and one each for political change, liberalization, and technological 
change. Of the oldest group, five reported economic change, seven said religion, two 
discussed technological change, and “openness,” language change, and demographics 
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each had one claimant. Obviously, there is quite a bit of overlap regarding these opinions, 
but also several differences, namely a drop in perceptions of openness amongst older 
subjects. The following sections will endeavor to elucidate the nuances of the interview 
data. 		
Catholicism		
Not all recent damages to Irish collective memory are splintering. Some have 
even seemed to incite a unifying response, which may seem counterintuitive at first 
glance. Consider, though, Anastasio’s model, in particular the relationality element: due 
to the recursive nature of memory, the influence of other social group members on 
individual and group memories, and the modifying capacity of the collective relater, 
people are able to adjust their own memories in the presence of a convincing counter-
narrative (Anastasio et al, 2012). Thus, it is plausible that an exceptionally 
comprehensive counter-narrative in direct opposition to a collective representation 
concerning a given aspect of a culture could indeed cause people’s memories to shift en 
masse. In the context of Ireland, this seems to be what has happened with regards to the 
Irish Catholic Church.	
 The previous sections briefly detailed the history of Catholic social dominance 
along with how Catholicism has become engrained into Irish collective memory. This 
paradigm began to change during the latter half of the 20th century (Ganiel, 2016). The 
shift was not a result of decreased visibility, considering the ratio of Catholic priests to 
laypeople increased from approximately 1:3500 to 1:400 from 1840-1960, but a change 
in culture (Scanlan, 2006). Louise Fuller attributes this to the Church’s inability to adapt 
to rapidly changing times, technology, and attitudes in Ireland starting in the 1950s 
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(Fuller, 2005, 41-43). However, the most powerful influence on public opinion was 
undoubtedly the priest sexual abuse scandals beginning in the 1990s and continuing into 
the 21st century. 	
 Bearing in mind the doctrine of sexual asceticism and “sins of the body” preached 
actively in the Irish Catholic Church for over a century, it makes sense that people would 
have a strong reaction to allegations of systemic sexual transgressions. Much of the 
population felt that the scandals exposed hypocrisy within the clergy; for instance, 
Ciaran, a 22 year old bartender working in Dublin, said that, “There’s not a lot of love for 
the church in my generation. I hate the church—bunch of arseholes. They’re sexually 
repressive, yeah, except amongst themselves.” The same man claimed to “love the gay 
marriage referendum.” Additionally, Abi, 29, from Waterford, believes tha, ““People 
have been questioning the exact meaning of traditional values…people have been 
realizing mistakes so far as family values and our culture. You can hold your own belief.” 	
This notion was shared by many of those who were interviewed; people indicate 
that bucking the Church’s influence had a liberating effect on society’s perceptions of 
social mores, pushing social ideology in a more progressive direction. When asked about 
the most prevalent cultural changes in the country, Niall, 40, living in Galway claims that 
it’s “the decline of the Catholic Church,” which “opened up new opportunities…released 
the two main parties and sort of unfroze the country.” This quote is especially interesting 
considering James Joyce’s repetition of the word “paralysis” in his seminal work, 
Dubliners, which details Joyce’s observations of stagnancy in early modern Ireland. 	
Indeed, people seem to associate Catholicism with a stifling of growth within the 
country and agree that its waning influence allows for more social freedom, which is 
MEMORY,	NARRATIVE,	AND	IDENTITY	SHIFTS	IN	CONTEMPORARY	IRELAND							43	
interesting considering approximately 85% of the country identified as Catholic in 2011 
according to the Central Statistics Office of Ireland. However, it should also be noted that 
this is the lowest reported Catholic percentage in history, a massive decrease from 94.9% 
in 1961, the highest ever reported. Furthermore, the number of people reporting atheism, 
agnosticism, or no religious preference increased from 67,413 in 1991 to 277,237 in 
2011. In terms of population proportion, this is nearly a threefold increase—from 1.9% to 
5.8% (Ireland, 2011; Cochran & Waldmeir, 2015, p. 53). Additionally 25-34 year olds 
make up a disproportionate 26% of the nonreligious population, palpable evidence of a 
generational shift in progress (Cochran & Waldmeir, 2015, p. 54). 	
Taking this a step further, consider the following, taken from an interview with 
Dr. Emilie Pine, 38, in Dun Laoghaire:	
The ritual act of memory is hugely in conflict with Catholic memory…	
The Catholic Church didn’t adapt with social change, so now we see a rejection of 
the exercising of power in the church… If the church had been less repressive, 
things may have gone differently. Even if they had said ‘we’re not going to marry 
gay people, but if they go and get civil unions what’s that got to do with us?’ Who 
knows what might have happened?	
She also called the “Yes” movement leading up to the gay marriage referendum “an 
active dissociation between past and present.” These quotes expose several interesting 
aspects of this collective memory shift away from Catholic social control. Firstly, as was 
previously stated, people seem to display an acknowledgement of Catholicism’s 
difficulty with adapting to modernity as well as feelings of betrayal due to sexual 
infidelity within the church. Furthermore, she draws connections between waning support 
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for the Catholic Church and the success of the Marriage Equality Act in May 2015, 
which, in a resounding 62-38 victory, made Ireland the first country to legalize gay 
marriage by popular vote (McDonald, 2015). 60.5% of eligible voters participated in the 
polls, which places the referendum in the top 5 in history in terms of voter turnout. 	
 Young people especially mobilized around the “Yes” movement, with over 80% 
of voters aged 18-24 voting in favor of marriage equality at a much higher turnout than 
the previous general election (Elkink et al, 2015). When asked about the most prominent 
cultural changes in the past 5 decades, Ella, 29, said, “Definitely the referendum. It’s the 
first time Ireland has progressed in equal rights and the first time the youth has engaged 
in voting and democracy.” Others also echoed this sentiment. Asked the same question, 
Niamh, 27, said, “There’s also the referendum. I voted yes, but I was so surprised. That 
wasn’t supposed to happen.” Saoirse, 21, commented: “I think it’s great. I wasn’t even 
sure it would pass. There was a silent majority that wasn’t speaking out. It’s time for 
equality…there’s an obvious homosexual minority.” These statements indicate a notion 
that the referendum represents a positive move away from the Church and towards a 
secular society; this was often accompanied by a genuine sense of shock regarding the 
weakened influence of Catholicism on social opinion.	
 The referendum was also approved in every constituency except South Leitrim-
Roscommon, a sparsely populated rural area (Ireland, 2015). Other rural counties, usually 
strongholds of social conservatism—Professor Michael King at Trinity College Dublin, 
35, noted an “obstructionist element in rural Irish farmers [who]…will vote no just to 
vote no”—still passed the bill. John, a 23-year-old male student from rural Clare claimed: 
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“I voted yes. I didn’t really think much of it, really. It was just the right thing to do. I 
didn’t really do much research on it or anything. Just live and let live.” 	
 This adage—“live and let live”—and general enthusiasm towards secularism was 
echoed several other times in discussions of the referendum—and not only among young 
people. Brian, 57, from Dublin claimed, “I voted yes. Of course I voted yes. It could be 
my son. People just need to live and let live.” He also said, “The Catholic church has 
done major damage to this country. The priest that married me is locked up now—you 
can look him up. The only reason people go to mass is if they don’t, the neighbors will be 
talking.” Another man from Galway, Martin, said:	
When I grew up, even up to the 1980s, the church dominated social mores. The 
referendum shows we are shaking the shackles of church domination. We’ve done 
that, I think. I’ve been there, having been born in the 40s, coming from a Catholic 
background. It’s fantastic, it’s great [the referendum]. Change has been enormous 
for the good, I think back to you can’t eat meat Friday. Hell and damnation, pulpit 
pumping is long gone.	
One woman, Judy, 72, said about the referendum:  “It’s terrific. The first time 
Catholicism has no stranglehold on what we say and believe. Grannies have grandkids 
who are gay. It just made sense.” This actually reflects the wide, cross-generational 
support base for marriage equality. One study looked at voting statistics and determined 
that even though people aged 18-24 voted in much larger numbers than normal, the 
referendum still would have passed with ease. Save the 65+ age group, all groups voted 
“yes” at well over 50% and over 75% voters under the age of 45 voted in favor (Elkink et 
al, 2015). Professor Tony Varley at NUI Galway described this phenomenon, saying, 
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“You couldn’t predict this 30 years ago. We were steadfastly Catholic then…But this is 
the politics of the future, the basis of mobilization in our country.” Indeed, it does seem 
that people, regardless of age, are beginning to rally around support for a more secular 
society, reflecting a shift in memory of the Catholic Church from a positive, obedient 
manner towards a more Western, individualistic, freethinking ideology. People also seem 
to show an acknowledgement that shared representations of the Church are indeed 
changing; for instance, Martin’s discussion of his memories of the Catholic Church in the 
1980s reveals an interesting tendency to memorialize the more negative, unpleasant 
aspects of the institution, which might not have been the case before the scandals in the 
1990s, and Tony’s assertion that “you couldn’t have predicted this 30 years ago” 
indicates that memories of adherence to the Church have faded quite a bit.	
 Both Brian and Emilie also touched on another very important point: collective 
memory of the Catholic Church as an institution versus memory of Catholicism as a 
religion. As Emilie points out, Irish people as a whole seem to retain positive memories 
of their religious beliefs alongside major disenchantment with the Church insofar as it 
exists as an establishment. In fact, one study, performed in October 2011 by Amarach 
Research for the Iona Institute, found that less than half—approximately 35%—of Irish 
Catholics attend mass on a weekly basis, a major drop from over 90% in 1961. People 
were grouped into age groups of 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55+. The only age 
group above 50% was 55+ at 52%, and all other age groups polled below 35% (Attitudes 
towards the Catholic Church, 2011). This certainly supports Brian’s expressed ideas of 
indifferent attitudes towards mass and the Church as a whole.	
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 More interesting is people’s opinions towards the Church itself. Though 70% of 
people in the poll identified as Catholic, only 24% of all adults indicate favorable opinion 
of the Church. Again, people over the age of 55 are the most sympathetic, with 55% 
claiming a favorable position, but 44% indicate an unfavorable opinion; what’s more, less 
than 20% of people surveyed from all other age groups were positive towards the Church. 
People also estimate, on average, that 28% of priests are guilty of abuse despite the fact 
that only 4% have been accused. These data strongly imply a shift in opinion away from 
Catholicism as an institution, but not necessarily the religion itself. In support of this, 
almost half of all those surveyed (46%) believe Catholic teachings are still of value to 
Irish society (Attitudes towards the Catholic Church, 2011).	
 Data collected in interviews corroborate this implication as well. One woman in 
her 50s, Mary, lodged a complaint: “Negative reactions against the Catholic Church are 
justified but the young generation is going too far in the other direction. Their attitudes 
towards casual sex, drink, are really quite extraordinary. The pre drinking culture is 
getting way out of hand.” Three other surveyed adults, including two religious officials, 
agreed with this sentiment; one of them, a 51-year-old priest in Dublin, said: “There is a 
sense of revolution against every inherited value. This was exposed in the referendum. 
It’s change, no more, no less.” Though the religious bias must be recognized here, these 
attitudes towards social change demonstrate that Catholic teachings—particularly 
concerning public morality—do seem to remain intact, especially in older individuals.	
 How did this cross-generational shift, excluding the very oldest members of 
society, occur in Ireland? How did this damage to collective memory—specifically to the 
collective relater’s ability to make positive emotional connections to Catholic memory—
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result in such a broad decrease in support? As was stated earlier, individual memory 
seems to be heavily influenced by emotion (Adolphs et al 1997; Wimmer & Shohamy, 
2012). Applying Anastasio’s analogy of individual to collective memory, it could be that 
the sensational, emotional nature of the priest abuse scandals provided a deeper damage 
to collective memory than a less emotionally charged event—such as economic growth 
(Anastasio et al, 2012). The comprehensive media coverage of the scandals certainly kept 
the events constantly in the collective buffer, allowing the recursive process of memory 
formation to continuously update memory over a long period of time. Additionally, it 
could be that slowly waning opinions of the Church in older people before the 
referendum due to other causes (television and radio access, technological advancements, 
better education, etc.) “primed” society for the traumatic memory damage provided by 
the scandals, allowing the event to more thoroughly change collective memory of 
Catholicism (Fuller, 2005; Cochran & Waldmeir, 2015; Ganiel, 2016). 	
Finally, why do older generations hold on to Catholic ideas of social morality? 
Using the individual-collective analogy once more, damage to the relater element in 
individuals—the hippocampus—can cause retrograde amnesia of memories in close 
temporal proximity to the traumatic event; however, memories much earlier than the 
event often remain intact (Scoville & Milner, 1957). Due to the analogous model, it could 
be feasible that Catholic teachings still remain in sufficiently old individuals as remote 
unconsolidated collective memory, which would explain the widespread decline in 
opinion towards the church along with the simultaneous retention of Catholic morality.		
Effects of the Celtic Tiger	
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 Though not quite as “clean” and straightforward to describe as damages to Irish 
Catholic memory, the changes to the Irish economy brought about by the Celtic Tiger 
moment of the ‘90s and early 2000s certainly had observable effects on Irish collective 
memory. However, compared to Catholic priest abuse scandals, this damage to collective 
memory of the economy is far less emotionally connected and somewhat more 
complicated. Data from interviews point to palpable age and urban/rural divides along 
with a questioning of the place of perceptions of Irishness, insofar as they pertain to the 
change from a traditional to modernized economic landscape.	
  First off, views towards the Celtic Tiger itself seem to be quite polarized. Some 
of those interviewed had an almost entirely positive view, such as Orla, a Dublin 
economics professor:	
It gave us hope. We were confident. It felt like we had come into out own at long 
last…I cannot even explain to you…we switched on the TV every day, saw the 
amount of people killed. I cannot explain the effect this had on the psyche of the 
Irish People.	
For Orla, then, the Tiger serves as a sort of coming of age moment for Ireland, a 
positive foil to the violence caused by The Troubles. It seems that for many people, the 
boom provided a glimmer of hope when other aspects of society were falling apart, such 
as connections to the Catholic Church. This provides some explanation as to positive 
collective memory of the event. Ella, 29, from Dublin, believes, “People were very proud 
of being from a wealthy country.” However, others see the Tiger in a far different light. 
For instance, when asked about the greatest change in society, Micheal, 32, from Ennis 
gave a scathing commentary:	
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The economy. With the Tiger, you find these people, they’ve got a big house, two 
cars, and no personality. To be honest, I think the recession was the best thing that 
could’ve happened to the Irish. It brought us back down to earth and helped us 
remember our old values and traditions.	
Abi, 29, from Waterford would likely agree with Micheal. She recounted an 
interesting story illustrating her beliefs:	
I think it was too far ahead of its time. One day, my father and I trespassed on an 
abandoned property in the Midlands. It’s a family estate, a double-courtyarded 
family estate. It used to be a shooting lodge, so basically a rich person’s hobby 
boat…three generations of derelict structures. At the back of that, a proposed golf 
cart garage...We also found the bones of a half built hotel, no roof. Each room had 
a box of a bedroom, unfinished. Business cards were strewn all over the floor. It’s 
absolute devastation without inhabitation. That’s the Tiger for you. People got 
greedy, and Ireland hasn’t really caught up with how much money was spent.	
Despite the massive success of the economy during the Tiger period, people like 
Micheal and Abi take the stance that it actually had a net negative effect on Ireland. 
These people seem to believe that the modernizing effects of the economic boom caused 
people to move away from traditional Irish culture. For instance, one man from Galway 
noted, “There’s this moral panic about the rise of egotistic culture, fed by the Celtic 
Tiger.” Niamh, 27, a Dublin woman, would also agree with this sentiment. Consider the 
following quote from her:	
For a long time, it was shameful to enjoy yourself. It was shameful to spend, and 
that’s why we left. I think we went from a country that loved being rich to an 
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incredibly austere society, and I think people left because of it. People have 
started to loosen their purse-strings again and so Irish people are returning—from 
America, from Europe, and Australia—Australia was huge for a while. And 
though I left for a reason, while I was away I thought of home often. I missed it 
quite a bit, which led me to return.	
Niamh’s commentary not only highlights a transition away from loose spending 
practices—often seen as a cause of the 2008 crash—but also a belief that people looked 
down upon others and pushed blame one another, along with institutions like the banks. 
Research done by O’Flynn, Monaghan, and Power (2014) confirms this idea (p. 925-27). 
Niamh’s point also suggests one potential cause for massive youth emigration during the 
years after the crash (Mac Einri & White, 2008). It seems, in light of these data, that the 
Irish collective was in the process of consolidating a new economic narrative of 
prosperity, but this consolidation was interrupted by the crash. Thus, people’s opinions 
on the Tiger and the economy in general were fractured, resulting in several different 
narratives regarding the Tiger moment.	
Additionally, there seems to be an interesting age divide in terms of hope for the 
economy’s recovery that might highlight different consolidated narratives among 
different age groups. People below the age of 35 seem to have hope that the economy 
will recover its former level of growth and success. Neil, 24, who works in the 
technology sector in Dublin, claimed, “We’re going to be ok as long as multinational 
companies invest and we’re given opportunities to invest abroad.” He also said, 
“Ireland’s future…is directly tied to the EU.” Ciaran, 22, also from Dublin, confirmed 
this view as well. When asked about whether he was pessimistic or optimistic about the 
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future of Ireland’s economy, he said, “I think so. I hope jobs will get back to where they 
once were. Everyone has a very strong work rate. I have two young siblings in college, 
working with me, now working. Education’s so good…that it’ll definitely recover.” 
However, older interviewees seem to be far less convinced. One unemployed woman 
from Cork, age 60, said, “I hope our children will be in a better situation than us…I’m 
not convinced, though.” Further, another woman, Judy, 72, originally from Athlone but 
living in Galway, said, “Anything outside of the Pale3 suffered, got poorer. Not a huge 
change here [from the Tiger], but very much Ireland as an island… I hope the economy 
recovers. Not to go back to silliness. Not looking good, though. It’s only getting worse.” 
The disparity between these comments highlights an interesting phenomenon where two 
different narratives exist based on the economy’s ability to improve. It could be that older 
people had far more experience with a poor, protectionist economy from the days of 
Eamon de Valera, and thus have a remote consolidated collective memory of poverty. 
Because of this, these people are more likely to see the Celtic Tiger as an anomaly, a 
diversion from a more strongly consolidated memory of austerity. However, people under 
the age of 35 have far more experience with a powerful, global economy and thus could 
have consolidated a different economic narrative from their elder counterparts, making 
them more likely to be optimistic about the future. This actually makes sense considering 
research shows that in European societies, “happiness starts off relatively high in early 
adulthood, then falls” (Pittau et al, 2009, p. 350).	
Judy’s comments also bring out another important point: there seem to be 
differences in memory consolidation of the economy in urban and rural areas. Though 																																																								3	“The Pale” is a term used by Irish people to refer to the area of Ireland directly controlled by the British in 
the Middle Ages (Ferriter, 2005). In the present day, this term is often used to refer to Dublin and its 
surrounding area.	
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Judy now lives in Galway, her experience living in Athlone—not necessarily rural, but 
certainly much smaller than major urban areas such as Cork and Dublin—gives her 
insight into the views of a different subgroup of the Irish collective. Rural areas did not 
experience quite as much of the modernizing effects of the Tiger as other, more urban 
areas; indeed, one study done in 1998—the middle of the Celtic Tiger moment— by the 
Irish Central Statistics Office showed far more unemployment in rural areas in the 
southeast and midlands and along the border than in more urban areas such as Dublin 
(Ireland, 1999). One farmer from Doolin, age 67, when asked about economic change, 
said, “Oh, Dublin, they get all the money and all the grants and what do we get? I guess 
we’ll suffer on, I suppose. That’s just Ireland.” Thus, it seems that people living in rural 
areas that gained less benefit from the industrialization process during the 90s have a less 
positive memory of the Celtic Tiger, and perhaps still have a generalized narrative of a 
more agrarian Ireland.		
Elements of Nationalism	
 Unlike recent damages to traditional Catholic memory, nationalist collective 
memory change in Ireland has not been quite so clean or easy to understand. Much of this 
can be attributed to the variety of factors at play with regards to Irish national identity, 
including immigration and growing multiculturalism, political corruption, The Troubles 
in Northern Ireland, music, sport, and modernization. This section will move to examine 
these and other issues along with their effects on people’s perceptions of Irishness and the 
ways people engage with their past through collective memory of major historical events, 
such as the Easter Rising of 1916. 	
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Here, I aim to elucidate the complicated dynamics of nationalist memory 
consolidation at many levels, including different political and cultural elements and the 
influence of the Troubles on collective memory in the Republic and Northern Ireland, 
among others. These factors allowed for the both development of regional identities and 
differential collective memory consolidation, not only when comparing the North and 
South but also among different counties within the Republic.		
Easter Rising Commemorations	
 Marches, protests, and other public demonstrations serve as an interesting 
phenomenon with regards to collective memory consolidation. They externalize a certain 
narrative in a powerful manner, albeit temporarily, while creating a sense of unity among 
the members of the demonstration. Often, through shared experiences between 
participants and intergroup interactions between the active subgroup and the larger 
collective, these demonstrations can promote a sense of unity, both within the 
demonstration itself and in the larger community as a whole. 	
For example, regarding a 1987 political march in Yerevan, Armenia, Nora 
Dudwick (1994) writes that such political mass-mobilization can “become the basis for 
new memories and identities which can be invoked during later stages of political 
activism” (p. 145). Later, she comments that the marches created a “sense of sacredness” 
and a “sense of unity” among participants; apparently, many participants noted 
experiencing “a wonderful feeling of being present everywhere, in every place occupied 
by that huge body of people” (p. 178) and that “meeting in public in defiance of a 
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government ban, speaking back to the authorities, and experiencing themselves as part of 
collectivity created a feeling of communitas” (p. 180).	
  In a similar vein, one of the most useful tools for studying the process of Irish 
collective memory consolidation, especially pertaining to Irish nationalist memory, is the 
occurrence of Easter Rising commemorations. Beiner (2007) notes “Ireland is deeply 
troubled by evocative memories of its past, not least of 1916, which inhabits a mythic 
time and space reverberating with resonances that range far beyond the events of that 
year” (p. 366). These events occur annually and major anniversaries, such as the fiftieth 
in 1966, the ninetieth in 2006, and the hundredth in 2016, call for tremendous celebration 
and memorial. For this study, Rising commemorations are convenient because 
memorialization is usually accompanied by a reexamination of the original event in the 
context of current national attitudes, analogous to context-dependence in individual 
memory consolidation and retrieval (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Loftus 1993; Lowe, 
1982). In this sense, these demonstrations serve as a benchmark for nationalist memory, 
allowing researchers to chart memory and identity shifts insofar as they relate to a 
changing perceptions of the Easter Rising.	
 Take, for instance, the differences between the jubilee year Rising celebrations of 
1966 and the ninetieth anniversary commemoration in 2006. Since tensions with the 
North and Britain were starting to grow, Sean Lemass wished to focus on the developing 
modernization of Ireland and twenty-six county nationalism—excluding the six Northern 
counties— in order to preserve relations; he “constantly brought to the fore images and 
references to ‘modern’ Ireland so that the fiftieth anniversary commemoration was as 
much about the act of looking forwards as backwards, requiring a delicate negotiation 
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between tradition and change” (Higgins et al, 2006). However, President Eamon de 
Valera altered this aim by declaring in his speech that “the divided island remained the 
great unfinished business of the state and called for the restitution of the province of the 
great Gaelic clans,” thereby ensuring “the triumphalism of 1966 helped mask the halting 
steps toward realism the year before” (Foster, 2008, p. 102). 	
Celebration in Northern Ireland was quite different, with the Rising being 
recognized solely in an unofficial fashion—though still vehement, with demonstrators 
such as Kevin Agnew fighting for republicanism, and arguing “that Pearse and the other 
1916 veterans had not died for two Irelands” (Higgins et al, 2006). The state only 
officially recognized the Battle of the Somme, which also took place in 1916. The year 
1966 was also the year the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) declared war on the IRA, 
marking the beginning of the Troubles; in this context, the jubilee demonstrations are 
often thought of as taking on the strong feelings of nationalism already present in the 
country at the time while simultaneously igniting the ripe whisperings of revolution 
within the national consciousness. Sir Kenneth Bloomfield remarked that one could 
“identify the first stirrings of the current conflict in the clash of conflicting ideologies in 
1966, at the time of commemoration of the Easter Rising and the Battle of the Somme 
respectively,” and that “the events of 1966 are, perhaps, a timely reminder that in our 
society commemoration itself can too easily take on a confrontational quality” (Beiner, 
2007). The anniversary of 1998 took on a similar, but modified feeling as “Fianna Fail 
politicians attempted to legitimate the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement by 
drawing on a particular vision of history that referred to... the unfinished business of 
1916” (Grayson, 2016).	
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Evidence of collective memory change can be seen when comparing the 
enthusiastic 1966 commemoration with more recent celebrations, particularly those in 
2006 and 2016. Beiner (2007) comments, “Following the outbreak of the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland, commemoration of the insurrection was tainted with allegations that it 
inspired republican paramilitary violence” (366). In this sense, through the function of the 
collective relater, people connected memory of the rebellion with more recent, visceral 
memories of violence in the North, attenuating the fervency that accompanied earlier 
moments of remembrance. 	
The hundredth anniversary has also taken on a much different air than earlier 
demonstrations, partially due to increasing modernization. Though nationalist pride 
around the event still remains, with the government distributing tricolors and copies of 
the Proclamation to primary schools, it seems to have eroded quite a bit (Ferriter, 2016; 
Hjelmgaard, 2016). One recent news article quoted historian Charles Townshend, who 
said that “Over the last century, [the differences between Britain and Ireland] have, 
beyond doubt, significantly declined” and that “it may be harder than ever now to fully 
grasp the depth and intensity of nationalist hostility to England and Anglicization.” The 
same article included a statement from Irish political scientist Gail McElroy, who said, 
“It's not some kind of 'us against them,' anti-British event. It's seen as a reflection of 
modern Ireland, not the Ireland of 1916. To be Irish now is to be very cosmopolitan and 
inclusive” (Hjelmgaard, 2016). Thus, the “us vs. them” nationalist moment in Ireland 
seems to be declining sharply as the country continues to engage with a global economy 
and culture, thereby altering the manner in which Irish people participate in remembering 
their past.	
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Even the figures honored by the demonstrations seem to be changing. Banners 
have been hung this year on the College Green depicting not the signers of the 
Proclamation, but Henry Grattan, Daniel O’Connell, Charles Stewart Parnell, and John 
Redmond, demonstrative of a move away from memorialization of violent nationalism 
towards constitutional nationalists who some argue “made more of a contribution to the 
achievement of a sovereign Irish State than 1916 or the War of Independence” (Linehan, 
2016). Thus, Easter Rising demonstrations can be seen as a way to visualize the 
continuous updating of the generalized nationalist narrative. The commemorations bring 
generalized memory back into the collective buffer to be attended to by the relater, 
therefore changing the collective memory of the event as the context of remembrance 
gradually changes over time.		
Immigration and Multiculturalism	
 One area of Irish society that has certainly experienced rapid change over the past 
three decades is the ethnic makeup of the population. Traditionally, historians associate 
Ireland with a massive diaspora; due mainly to the Famine and a lagging economy, “the 
average annual net emigration from Ireland [between 1871 and 1961] consistently 
exceeded the natural increase in the Irish population, which shrank from about 4.4 
million in 1861 to 2.8 million in 1961” (Ruhs, 2009, p. 1-2). Additionally, immigration to 
Ireland was “virtually nonexistent” during this period (Mac Einri & White, 2008, p. 153). 
Thus, the act of leaving Ireland essentially became a major consolidated narrative in Irish 
collective memory, a narrative that was further implanted by much of the literature of the 
20th century.	
MEMORY,	NARRATIVE,	AND	IDENTITY	SHIFTS	IN	CONTEMPORARY	IRELAND							59	
 However, due to a more robust economy during the Celtic Tiger moment, an 
increase in employment, and immense foreign direct investment, the 90s in Ireland were 
characterized by a historically uncharacteristic influx of immigrants, with 1996 being the 
first year of net immigration, which would continue into the 21st century (Kline, 2004, p. 
187).  According to Mac Einri & White (2008), “The 1996 Census can be taken as 
marking the beginning of a modern period of net immigration. It showed a country which 
was still largely ethnically homogenous,” an aspect that would change dramatically in 
subsequent years (p. 153). Early on, returning Irish people comprised the majority of the 
migrants, but their proportion declined continuously; from 2006-2008 “Irish immigrants 
made up only 18 percent of the inflow.” During the early 2000s, the number of non-Irish 
EU and non-EU migrants rose dramatically and between 2001-2004, non-EU immigrants 
represented over one half of all non-Irish migrants (Ruhs, 2009, p. 2-3). The 2011 
Census, performed by the Central Statistics Office, found that 12% of Irish residents were 
non-nationals, an increase from 5.8% in 2002; further, 199 different nationalities were 
represented in Ireland and 12 different nations accounted for at least 10,000 residents 
(Ireland, 2012, p. 7-8). 	
 This surge of multiculturalism conflicts strongly with Ireland’s tradition of 
cultural nationalism, which is heavily reliant upon a homogenous population to fit the “us 
vs. them” or “Irish vs. British” narrative. One study, which used surveys to analyze 
seventeen countries and assign scores based on factors that influence nationalism, ranked 
Ireland second in both the ethnic nationalism and religious nationalism categories; factors 
that impacted these categories included pride in nationality, country of birth, religion, and 
duration of life spent in a country (Koos, 2007).  This attests to the high level of ethno-
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cultural nationalism in Ireland. Considering this context, how did such major changes in 
the ethnic structure alter Irish collective memory? 	
 In discussions of the greatest changes in Irish culture and society since 1960, 
approximately one third (4/13) of those interviewed between the ages of 30 and 50 
included demographics or immigration and 2/14 of those above the age of 50 agreed. 
None of those below the age of 30 listed demographics; however, far more subjects 
discussed demographic change in some regard. This demonstrates that issues of 
multiculturalism must be present in the buffer and relater, as people do tend to recall 
ethnic changes quite easily. Additionally, a narrative of Irish multiculturalism could be in 
the process of consolidation into stable storage, considering none of those in the youngest 
age bracket cited multiculturalism as a major change. This could be attributed to large-
scale immigration beginning during the childhood of the younger subjects, thereby 
exposing that subset of the population to ethnic diversity for the majority of their lives; in 
this sense, the young generation never truly developed a collective memory of Irish 
homogeneity—at least, not from their own experiences—but instead began the 
consolidation process of the narrative of multiculturalism Ireland from their early years.	
 One salient feature of Irish collective memory of multiculturalism is the narrative 
of change itself. Several people made comments concerning the major influx of 
immigration and the impact it had on their lives; shock seemed to be incorporated into 
these narratives. One Dublin man, 48, remarked: “I started school in the seventies…at 
that time, Ireland was the whitest, most Catholic place on the planet…This Pakistani man 
arrived and we couldn’t figure out what was happening. We’d touch his skin and 
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hair…You’d never seen a black person before, living there.” Consider, too, the following 
quote from a man, 38, also from Dublin:	
“Definitely the change in demographics. I mean, my brother and I lived near a 
seminary that would train these African men and my brother and I had never seen 
men like these before. We used to go and wait by the gate. We’d stand there and 
just wave. And they’d come with these big smiles—these dark, dark 
Africans…with big white smiles—and they’d wave back because they’d know 
exactly why we were doing it.”	
These quotes highlight the level of astonishment regarding the beginning of net 
immigration and the presence of other ethnicities. Furthermore, both stories, especially 
the first, demonstrate the physicality of race in Ireland along with the notions of 
“otherness” ascribed to people of non-Irish ethnicities. It seems that immigration had a 
jarring effect on people’s perceptions of Ireland and, potentially, their Irish identity.	
Evidence from other interviews seems to point to a cognizance of racism and a 
movement towards acceptance of other cultures. A man from Dublin, 39, said, “I’d like to 
see people get on with each other. You see a lot of tension between the classes, the 
foreigners and the Irish. I don’t think there’s any need for that oppression.”  One woman, 
29, claimed:	
“I think the fear of foreigners is ridiculous. If anything, that influx of people 
willing to work, that mass influx, they’re circulating more money than it would be 
if they were just Irish people…The Brazilian thing is really interesting. You have 
rich people who have come over and people who have worked their asses off in 
their own country who are willing to start a new life. They work to live and live to 
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work. They come here, but until they’ve learned English, they can’t return. They 
haven’t said no to staying in the country.”	
The ideas presented in the above quote demonstrate the willingness of some people to 
welcome non-Irish ethnic groups into Irish culture. Adding to this idea, one Dublin 
woman said, when asked about her hopes for the future, “More diversity, more tolerance, 
less xenophobia, less racism. I think it’s something that needs to be talked about, more 
awareness is needed, social media.” It seems that a counter-narrative to the old ethno-
cultural nationalism is consolidating, especially among younger Irish people—one geared 
towards a celebration of a multicultural, non-homogenous Ireland.		
Regional Identities and the Myth of the West	
 Despite the nationalist vision of many prominent 20th century Irish politicians, as 
discussed in Part Two, a striking amount of regionalism seems to have developed within 
the Republic of Ireland. In his book, In Search of Ireland: A Cultural Geography (1996), 
B.J. Graham confirms the existence of multiple distinct identities within Ireland, claiming 
that the island “created—and continues to sustain—a complex diversity of regions and 
localities, each with their own orientations, experiences, and mentalities” (p. 19). Graham 
refers to this phenomenon as a “regional mosaic,” caused—somewhat paradoxically—by 
Ireland’s connections to bordering European regions (Ulster to Scotland, Leinster to 
England, Munster/Connacht to Iberia), its insularity, and its geographic variation (p. 20-
21). Tom Inglis (2010) maintains that this idea of a mosaic of local identities holds true 
even within the context of globalization, attributing it to the prevalence of  “local 
networks of social support” along with an extraordinary sense of local and county 
MEMORY,	NARRATIVE,	AND	IDENTITY	SHIFTS	IN	CONTEMPORARY	IRELAND							63	
belonging in Ireland, with only Spain showing higher levels; indeed, in one survey, 85% 
of Irish respondents indicated feeling close to their town/city/locality (p. 5-6). These 
studies indicate a general acceptance of a “split” Ireland with regards to identity.	
 This study is less concerned with the history of regional identities, however; 
instead, I will focus on people’s perceptions of regional identities, especially in 
comparison to other localities, and the persistence of the regional mosaic of Irish identity 
into the twenty-first century. Unlike changes discussed in other sections of this paper, 
views on regional identities have remained relatively intact over the course of history due 
to a variety of factors, including differential levels of modernization, Celtic Revival 
literature, and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA).	
Take, for instance, perceptions of County Cork. Due to major involvement with 
the anti-Treaty side of the Irish Civil War4, the Irish War of Independence, and several 
earlier revolts against the British, Cork’s traditional nickname is “The Rebel County.” 
Two out of three interviewees from Cork noted this with a sense of pride during the 
interviews, and another young man from Mayo, 23, said, “[Clare, Kerry, and Cork] are 
the rebel counties. They consider themselves the real Irish because the British forces 
never conquered that far.” Interestingly, as illustrated by these responses, traditional, 
consolidated collective memory of regional identity markers seems to be quite well 
conserved.	
Dubliners’ insights regarding their own regional identity were also noteworthy. 
Firstly, two different Dublin men made comments about how Dublin “basically 																																																								4	This	refers	to	the	Anglo-Irish	Treaty	of	1921,	which	established	the	Irish	Free	State.	The	establishment	of	the	Republic	of	Ireland	would	come	later,	in	1948.	Many	of	the	rebels	were	against	the	Treaty,	as	it	meant	that	Ireland	would	remain	under	the	control	of	Britain,	which	many	saw	as	counter	to	their	initial	goal	of	independence.	
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dominates” Ireland; though this sentiment certainly has a foundation, the agreement 
connotes a sense of pride among Dublin residents. Indeed, one woman, 29, stated, 
“Dublin is more open-minded and multicultural. You’d find more traditional values in the 
West and more alternative communities like Galway.” With regards to the cultural aspect, 
her comment is interesting, considering Galway is actually the most multicultural city in 
Ireland in terms of population percentage; this indicates a slightly skewed perception of 
Dublin, possibly due to pride in the city as the economic and cultural hub of the country, 
a view other interviewees tended to convey. 	
Perhaps more interesting, though, are the inconsistencies between perceptions of 
regional differences of Dubliners and other Irish citizens. Most of the interview subjects 
noted an urban-rural divide in Ireland; however, while six out of the 22 surveyed Dublin 
residents did not believe in any cultural variance from region to region, 100% of those 
living outside of Dublin stated that there are cultural differences between regions, 
especially between East and West Ireland. This implies that Dubliners consider Ireland to 
be a much more culturally homogenous place than Irish people living in other areas 
would declare, which could be a result of Dublin’s historically globalized character and 
higher level of modernization when compared with the rest of Ireland (Kirby, 2004; 
Dolan, 2010). 	
One explanation of this disparity could be that Dublin has a greater exposure to a 
wider range of media than other, more rural areas; thus, more alternate viewpoints and a 
larger variety of information are made available in the buffer, thereby interfering with the 
relater’s capacity to consolidate a collective representation of identity differences. 
Professor Eoin O’Malley of Dublin City University corroborates this view: “Urban areas 
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are more exposed to different thought. Historically, the east coast could have access to 
BBC radio before other regions, which must have had some impact.” On the other hand, 
Ciaran, originally from Tipperary but residing in Dublin—giving him insight into the 
nuances of both rural and urban areas—said that the “only difference between the country 
and the city, I guess, is that people from Dublin don’t really know what’s happening 
around Ireland.” In this sense, Dubliners could simply be less interested in the goings-on 
of other areas of the country, exhibiting a more intentional focus on international and 
Dublin-centric matters. 	
When asked about identity variance across regions, Abi, originally from 
Waterford but now living in Dublin, said, “No. You can’t even say that [there’s a 
difference between regions]. That being said, the divide in Ireland is very, very 
noticeable…Sense of community is greater in rural spaces like the West…anonymity is 
impossible.” Along the same vein, Peter, 38, from Dublin, claimed, “Ireland is dominated 
by Dublin. There’s definitely an urban versus rural divide, as much as you’d see in any 
other country.” These opinions, along with Ciaran’s quote about the differences between 
urban and rural areas in the previous paragraph, bring out an interesting point—that 
people tended to instinctively associate the term “urban” with Dublin at a much greater 
frequency than other areas. This makes sense, considering Dublin is by far the largest 
metropolitan area in Ireland; however, people often consider Dublin as the only “real” 
urban area, which is not entirely accurate. Additionally, as is demonstrated in Abi’s 
quote, Dubliners may indicate a belief in the lack of difference between regions but, by 
exclusively applying the identifier “urban” to Dublin (albeit unintentionally) these people 
may actually imply a regional divide.	
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Furthermore, outsider perceptions of Dublin tend to be quite unsympathetic, as 
there seems to be a sense of separation from the city. For instance, one man, 23, from 
Clare gave the following statement:	
I was doing a work visa program in New York with a bunch of guys from the 
Midlands, a couple from the South, no one from Dublin though. We all got to 
talking and I think we realized, I realized I’ve never really met a sound lad from 
Dub. They’re stuck up and they think they’re all that, but they’re not all that.	
This not only demonstrates animosity and anti-Dublin sentiment, but also the powerful 
effects of a social group on memory retrieval and consolidation. Also, it illustrates a 
sense of “rural vs. Dublin” or “Dublin vs. the rest of Ireland,” an interpretation given by 
Eoin O’Malley in his interview. Additionally, a middle-aged man from Galway gave n 
interesting testimony regarding regional identities in Ireland:	
There’s a sense of alienation between Dublin and the rest of Ireland. My 
son…Dublin for him is a really important other. There’s a definite sense of 
difference from Dublin, sort of an opposition… For me, the south of Ireland is 
important to describe Clare, Cork, and Kerry. It really grates on me when people 
use the term ‘South’ to refer to the whole Republic. I heard it when I was 20 years 
old and thought ‘What!’ A visitor once said to my son that, ‘In the South,’ and my 
son stopped him…he said, “You’re not in the South, you’re in the West!’ He 
didn’t even realize that might have offended the man. He just wanted to correct 
him, I think.	
Finally, several people remarked on linguistic differences. The only subjects who 
considered the Irish language an important part of their lives, unsurprisingly, lived 
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outside of Dublin, with most living on the west coast. Additionally, Mary, 57, 
commented on language differences between Dublin and Galway:	
There’s a dramatic difference in language spoken. The version of English is 
totally different in Dublin and Galway. Dublin English is quite Americanized, but 
Galway people often use Irish syntax…would probably embarrass people.”	
These narratives confirm feelings of isolation from Dublin in other areas of 
Ireland. Many Dublin residents indicate awareness of these feelings; for example, David, 
34, believes, “There’s a bit of a target on Dublin’s back. With the GAA, the rest of the 
country would want anyone but Dublin winning.” However, others are not quite as 
attuned, with multiple people agreeing on a lack of anti-Dublin sentiment elsewhere in 
Ireland; such discrepancy adds another layer to the previous postulation that Dubliners 
are not familiar with the views of other areas of Ireland, with David’s quote complicating 
the impression.	
Additionally, opinions regarding characteristics of the West also provide an 
interesting look at the persistence of consolidated collective memory. When asked about 
regional differences, Michael, 50, from Galway noted, “We’re friendlier. There’s more 
education about Irishness to students. There’s a lot more multiculturalism. All the 
strangers make us [as Irish people, in the strangers’ perspectives] a bit more Irish.” 
Others, including people residing outside of the west, corroborated this belief; however, 
some disagreed with this point of view. David, the Dublin man mentioned earlier, 
claimed, “The west is more stuck in the 70s…In the west, they stick to their own…If you 
walked into the pub, they’d look at you if they didn’t know you, if you know what I 
mean.” The stark contrast between these two viewpoints indicates the complexity of 
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regional identities, along with the difficulty in studying them due to the fact that local 
pride creates a great amount of bias, possibly skewing people’s perceptions and 
responses.	
Perhaps the most interesting finding, though, is the robust endurance of romantic 
ideas of the west. As was described earlier, Celtic Revivalist artists and nationalist 
politicians largely constructed a myth of a Celtic, “true” Irish west (O’Kelly, 2004, p. 
510). Some people—especially academics—are conscious of this. One professor, Mary, 
literally said, “romantic notions were manufactured” and that these notions are “kind of a 
barrier…it’s dangerous to romanticize.” Elaine, a 21-year-old Dublin bartender, 
supported this claim: “Yes they do. Absolutely. The romantic idea of the West persists. 
Everyone leaves and doesn’t return. We’re still that generation, though.” Professor Lillis 
O’Laoire confidently argued in favor of this view:	
It’s still expressed strongly through sport and song. It’s still tied to capitalism. 
You have to rethink the whole concept of folklore. Connemara, Aran Islands—
you see it there. Kildare is steeped in Fenian culture. There are still people there 
who tell Finn MacCool stories, and they were told popularly until the 1930s. But 
it goes deeper than that and below that. I think it’s harder to see on an everyday 
basis without staying in a place for long and seeing how things work.	
However, many, including westerners, express remarkably idealistic perceptions. 
Interviewed in a pub in Doolin, a Limerick man said, “You’ve come to the right place. 
This is the real Ireland.” A young man from Clare, 23, discussed how he recommends 
tourists experience Ireland by saying, “I always tell people—if you want to see the real 
Ireland, start up in Donegal and work your way down the coast through Galway—go to 
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Dublin, definitely see the capital, but that’s not all there is.” Paradoxically, even people 
who indicated doubt regarding this romanticism conveyed romantic impressions of the 
west. As was mentioned earlier, Peter, 38, from Dublin denied the existence of regional 
differences but said, “No, more of an acknowledgement of the magnificent space in the 
West. It’s just magnificent.” Though not explicitly romantic in nature, Peter’s comments 
do show awe, a sort of idealism surrounding the natural environment. This continued 
romanticizing of Connacht shows how a sufficiently consolidated, fully generalized 
narrative can persist, even if the basis behind it was, in fact, largely fabricated. Once a 
collective memory is passed from the relater into generalized, stable storage, this 
narrative is incredibly difficult to extract and/or modify without a significantly damaging 
traumatic event (Anastasio, 2012). Since the Celtic Revival popularized the myth of the 
west, thereby creating a robust narrative of a Celtic west, the recursive nature of 
collective memory assured that this myth did not fade.		
The Troubles	
 Obviously, The Troubles stand out as the most shocking series of events in recent 
Irish history—and, thus, they certainly had a jarring effect on Irish collective memory. 
Much of the changes involve an increased schism between Northern Irish and Irish 
identities and amplified the importance of religious identification in Northern Ireland 
relative to Ireland. A major age divide was also observed between the oldest members of 
the population and everyone else. These findings indicate an interesting identity dynamic 
with major geographic, community (urban vs. rural), and age components.	
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 Firstly, the Troubles drove a palpable wedge between Northern and Southern 
identities. Niall, a Galway man, claimed, “Our view of the North is shaped by the 
violence…For the longest time, the North was a place to be helped…Or [alternatively] 
ferocious violence could contaminate Ireland.” Later in the interview, he also 
commented, “There’s an underlying sense of difference from the rest of Ireland. The 
Troubles intensified this…Irish nationalism didn’t really come through during their time 
of hardship.” Professor Richard McMahon of Trinity College agreed with this view:	
Northern Ireland becomes a part of a fracture in the UK, which Southern Ireland 
sees itself as separate from. There’s a divergence, a stronger sense of 
separateness. Differences are now far more apparent. What degree is the 
separation between Northern and Southern nationalists? I think Southern 
nationalists have no real understanding of Northern nationalism.	
Another man from Dublin, Michael, 35, said the following of the symbol of the Irish 
tricolor and Irish republicanism:	
Sinn Fein is not my generation’s version of Ireland…To me, the tricolor is not a 
symbol of my generation’s Ireland either. I think it was hijacked by extreme 
republicanism. I think the tricolor was hijacked by extreme republicanism. Now, 
I’d walk away from a republican street performance making use of the tricolor. To 
me, it’s not a symbol of my generation’s Ireland. I think IRA culture terrifies the 
young generation, too.”  	
There seems to be a retreat from identifying with Northern Ireland as well as the IRA, 
which conflicts with the prominent nationalist narrative of desire for a united Ireland. 
However, despite this want to dissociate from the violence of Northern Ireland Irish 
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nationalist/republican ideas do continue to have an impact on the process of collective 
memory consolidation. When asked about her hopes for the future, Saoirse, 21, from 
Galway, said, “In the long term, I’d hope Northern Ireland would possibly come to be 
seen as a part of Ireland as a whole. That the controversy ends. Since the queen came and 
shook hands with the Sinn Fein leader—I think it was a big step.” Saoirse’s hope 
indicates the continued presence of an Irish nationalist narrative that escaped the 
traumatic events of the Troubles, implying that this narrative is remotely consolidated 
and ingrained in Irish national identity.	
 Another important result is the presence of an age divide in Northern Ireland with 
respect to collective memory of The Troubles. Everyone interviewed in Belfast and Derry 
considered violence to be the greatest present issue and the most marked change in the 
past several decades. However, older people (above the age of 65) tend to have a 
different perception of the way the violence affected society. Take the testimony of Pat, 
72, from Belfast, for example: “I saw 57 people blown up right here. Look down, look 
down. There were holes in this concrete. You can’t see them now, but I saw them. But 
that’s only Belfast.” His musing of “that’s only Belfast” after discussing a vivid memory 
of destruction might imply a belief that endemic to Belfast due to the strong consolidated 
narrative of violence in Northern Ireland. Another man named Paddy, age 67, gave the 
following interesting, albeit somewhat shocking, statement:	
In 20 years, I hope it’s the same as it is today. You can lead a horse to water, but 
you can’t make him drink. We want to live separately. Why fix what’s not 
broken? Just because we’re not friends doesn’t mean we have to hurt each other. 
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Sometimes it’s better if the wrong is what’s right. We’re separate, and everything 
is fine.	
 Paddy also claimed that Shankill, a predominantly Protestant, working class 
neighborhood is “the heart of Ku Klux Klan territory.” For the older population of 
Northern Irish citizens, The Troubles have become an important part of their identity. In 
their eyes, it seems to be the case that violence is an ongoing narrative in the region and 
that separation of Protestants and Catholics is necessary to keep peace. 	
 Younger inhabitants, however, stray from this identity. Many seem to have a 
tendency to look at the violence as a relic of the past and not an identity marker. When 
asked about major differences, Angela, 25, of Belfast said: 	
It’s a lot less turbulent now. My generation doesn’t really understand that. We 
celebrate culture a lot more because of that. The city center used to shut down at 
night, and it’s beginning to come alive again. So is the Catholic quarter. In the 
Troubles, people would socialize in their own areas—more safe.”	
 Another Belfast woman, Jenny, 23, noted the continuation of a divide between 
Protestants and Catholics. However, unlike Paddy, this was a point of conflict for her. “I 
don’t care what religion you are, if it would just disappear it’d be easier. If everyone 
could just think about if the person’s right instead of what they actually are.” Ciaran, 22, 
a sport shop worker in Derry-Londonderry seems to concur with this view. 
“Londonderry—Derry divide is a big problem. I wouldn’t call it Londonderry. There’s a 
divide between Catholics and Protestants still. There are some people who are bitter, they 
hold grudges. We’re just reliving the past, it’s pointless.” Ciaran’s mother, Marilyn, 61, 
agreed with him, saying, “My hopes would be be happy, live and let live…All 
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nationalities and religions be happy with each other…friends and peace.” Thus, it seems 
that younger generations of Northern Irish wish to leave the violent past behind rather 
than continue to consolidate a narrative of separation. It could be that older people—
those above the age of 65—were teenagers or adults during the beginning of the 
Troubles, allowing this age group ample time to consolidate memory of the violence 
while younger members of society were either too young to experience the strife for 
themselves or hadn’t been born yet. 		
Conclusions and Directions of Further Research	
 First, my primary research confirms Anastasio’s idea of the existence of remote 
consolidated collective memory. It seems that older generations of Irish people have a 
consolidated narrative of both the moral aspects of Catholicism and Ireland’s economy 
pre-Celtic Tiger, as evidenced by judgement towards the drinking and sexual behavior of 
young people and lack of hope for the economy’s recovery, respectively. 	
 Further, and most prominently, the data presented gives strong evidence for 
capacity of consolidated collective memory to be updated, fractured, and changed based 
on significant events, much like long-term individual memory. This can be most readily 
seen in the major changes to collective memory of Catholicism due to the priest abuse 
scandals and Magdalen laundries, but can also be seen in other aspects of Irish collective 
memory. Other examples include the widening of the identity gap between the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland due to The Troubles, changes in people’s memory of the 
Celtic Tiger as a result of the economic downturn, and memory of Ireland as a 
multicultural place.	
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 Finally, though memory can indeed be changed and damaged due to significant 
economic, social, and political events, generalized collective memory can also stand the 
test of these damages to collective memory if it has been sufficiently consolidated in the 
past. Evidence for this includes continued belief in the myth of the West and vestiges of 
the constructed Irish cultural nationalist narrative from the beginning of the 20th century.	
 One caveat to this research is its small scale, which is indicative of the limited 
resources available to an undergraduate student. This is not a criticism, simply an 
observation that one in my position would not have the capacity or means to perform 
research on a greater scale. It must be noted that this research is by no means exhaustive 
and is likely not perfectly representative of the entirety of Ireland, considering much of 
the claims were based off of a small sample size of 46 people. However, it does point to 
evidence that the current period of Irish culture is one of great flux and Irish collective 
memory does seem to be changing quite a bit. The research expounded upon here should 
be seen as the beginning of a conversation on Irish collective memory change, but 
certainly not the end of it. Further research should be devoted to larger surveys and more 
focused looks at the various nuances behind Irish identity in order to further understand 
the complex web of economic, social, and political factors that influence the way Irish 
collective memory changes and updates over time.						
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APPENDIX	
List of generic questions asked to all subjects:	
1. What do you see as the greatest or most evident difference in your culture in the 
past fifty years? 
2. Do you see any differences between regions in Ireland? 
3. (if subject didn’t discuss economy during question 1) How did the Celtic Tiger 
change your country? How would you describe the effects of economic changes? 
4. Do you see any major differences between generations? 
5. What are your hopes for the future? 
6. What are your opinions of the Catholic Church? 
7. What are the differences between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland? 
Additional questions for Northern Irish subjects:	
1. How would you describe your identity--Irish or Northern Irish? What does this 
identity mean to you? 
2. Are you religious? If so, what is your religion? What does your religion mean to 
you? 
3. Do you still see effects of The Troubles in your culture? If yes, what are they?  	
Interviews were fluid; I allowed subjects to take the conversation in whatever 
direction they chose and would ask questions based on this direction. Each subject was 
asked the same questions, but some discussed different things at a greater length than 
others.	
Photo from Albert Kahn collection of photographs, 1913	
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This photograph is interesting, as discussed in my interview with Professor Mary Clancy, 
because this woman would not have been wearing the cloak based on her age and the 
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